Notes and Comments by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 38 | Number 2 Article 4
2-1-1960
Notes and Comments
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Notes and Comments, 38 N.C. L. Rev. 249 (1960).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol38/iss2/4
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Agency--Family Purpose Doctrine--
Wife's Liability for Husband's Negligence
In Snall v. Mallory- the plaintiff's automobile was damaged in a
collision with an automobile driven by defendant's husband. The jury
found the husband negligent. On the issue of defendant's liability the
husband, as witness for the plaintiff, testified substantially as follows:
His wife had purchased the car three years before the accident; it had
not been purchased for cash, but had been financed and re-financed; both
he and his wife had been working when the car was purchased; she had
paid the taxes on the car, made several initial installment payments, and,
together with him, had paid repair bills up until the time she had stopped
working. However, his wife had not worked for "about three years,"
and while she was not working he had made all installment payments
and had paid the usual expenses incurred in operating an automobile.
Both he and his wife had used the car for their pleasure and convenience.
The question on appeal was whether, under these facts, the trial court
committed error in submitting the case to the jury on the wife's liability
for her husband's negligence under the family purpose doctrine2. The
court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. One justice dissented on
the ground that the husband, and not the wife, had provided and main-
tained the automobile for his own and the family's use. "A realistic
evaluation of the evidence indicates that through financing and re-
financing he was making payments, similar to rentals, to retain the pos-
session and use of the car."3
The family purpose doctrine has been used to assure recovery by an
outsider when a financially irresponsible member of a family causes
injury by his negligent operation of the family car.4 The doctrine is an
'250 N.C. 570, 108 S.E.2d 852 (1959).2 Since N.C. GEn. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953), which establishes a prima fade case
of agency on proof of ownership, was not used by the plaintiff, the case went to
the jury on the family purpose doctrine alone. Letter from Mr. John L. Rendle-
man, attorney for plaintiff, September 30, 1959.
250 N.C. at 575, 108 S.E.2d at 855.
'The importance of the doctrine in North Carolina has been greatly reduced by
the Financial Responsibility Act, N.C. GEx. STAT. § 20-227 (1953), which requires
all automobile owners to carry liability insurance and writes into liability policies
a provision whereby anyone using the car with the insured's consent, either express
or implied, is himself insured. However, one can imagine at least two situations in
which the plaintiff would still want to join the member of the family who might be
liable under the family purpose doctrine, notwithstanding the Financial Responsi-
bility Act. The first is where the extent of the plaintiff's damages appears to be
more than the minimum amount of liability insurance required by the act and the
tort-feasor is himself "judgment proof." Unless the plaintiff invokes the doctrine,
he may get a substantial judgment only to discover that a large part of it is un-
collectible because of the driver's insolvency. The second is where the family auto-
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extension of the principle of respondeat superior,5 the theory of the
doctrine being that some member of the family has made it his business
to provide transportation in the form of an automobile for himself and
for other members of the family. Thus when the car is being used to
transport a member of the family it is being used in the business of the
providing member. Under this reasoning the ordinary rules of agency
are applied. Therefore, if a plaintiff is successful in casting a financially
responsible family member in the role of master, the collectibility of his
judgment is assured. The doctrine is of comparatively late vintage,0
and, although it could be applied with equal logic to any item furnished
for family use, it has been confined to automobiles.7
In North Carolina the family purpose doctrine was first recognized in
1918.8 Since that time, fairly well-established rules have attended its
application. A plaintiff in order to invoke the doctrine must allege and
prove that the car was customarily used by the family as a general-
purpose vehicle,9 and that at the time of injury it was being used' ° by an
authorized family member within the scope of his authority.1
Assuming these factors to be present, which member of the family
is to be held liable under the doctrine? Although the court has fre-
quently stated the rule in terms of a liability of the head of the house-
hold,12 it has not been necessary to show that the defendant was in fact
the head of the household to obtain a judgment against him.' 3 The fact
that one is the head of the household is a factor to be considered in
mobile involved was owned by an uninsured citizen of a state having no financial
responsibility act. In this situation under the prevailing conflicts of law rule the
doctrine as applied in North Carolina could be used by the plaintiff to hold the
"providing" member of the tort-feasor's family liable for his damages if it appeared
that the tort-feasor himself was financially irresponsible. Cronenberg v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78
S.E.2d 398 (1953).
'Lyon v. Lyon, 205 N.C. 326, 171 S.E. 356 (1933).
' One of the first cases applying the doctrine was Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo.
App. 415, 133 S.W. 351 (1911).
See, e.g., Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932), where the
niajoritv of the Minnesota court refused to apply the doctrine to motorboats.8 Clark v. Sweaney, 176 N.C. 529, 97 S.E. 474 (1918).
' Grier v. Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931), held that the burden
is on the plaintiff to show that the car was used for family purposes. This proof
gets his case to the jury. The burden then shifts to defendant to show that at the
time of injury the driver was not using it for such purposes.
"0 Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169 (1928), held the husband liable
where a third party was driving at the wife's request. Thus it is not necessary to
the invocation of the doctrine that a family member be driving the car. It need
only be driven in the interest of the family.I " In Vaughn v. Booker, 217 N.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 603 (1940), it was held proper
to instruct the jury to find for defendant father if it believed he had forbidden his
son to drive in Raleigh, the site of the accident.
'-See, e.g., Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 130 S.E. 630 (1925).
'8 In Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398 (1953), the wife was held
liable under the family purpose doctrine for the negligent operation of an automobile
without any mention of who was the head of the household.
[Vol. 38
1960] NOTES AND COMMENTS 251
fixing liability, but not a conclusive one. It seems that the true test for
determining which member of the family is to be held liable under the
doctrine is one of control. The basic question to be determined then is
who controls the car, not who is the head of the household.
14
The factors of ownership and maintenance have been used as a fur-
ther guide in determining which member of the family controls the car.' 5
In Matthews v. Cheatham'6 the court had before it the following situa-
tion: A minor child had won the family car in a newspaper contest; it
was registered in her name; the father had paid all costs of maintaining
the car. The mother was adjudged negligent while driving the car
alone. The court, in holding the father liable under the family purpose
doctrine, said that the one who owns, maintains or controls an auto-
mobile for family use is the one responsible for its negligent operation.
Thus the father was held liable, in spite of the fact that his daughter
held legal title to the car, on the ground that he maintained and con-
trolled it. Then in Goode v. Barton 7 it was expressly held immaterial
whose funds were used to purchase the car, since liability under the
doctrine "is not confined to owner or driver ... [but] depends upon
control and use.""' The "use" referred to here can only mean that use
for which the car was bought, i.e., use by the family as a general purpose
car. Since ownership, both legal and equitable, has been held not to be
determinative of control, it would seem that maintenance is the more
important guide in determining control and, hence, in predicting the
family member on whom liability will fall. In taking this view of the
doctrine, North Carolina is in line with the weight of authority.' 9
In the principal case the husband testified that the wife had pur-
chased the car by financing it and that he had never signed a mortgage.
Thus the wife was the purchaser. Since both husband and wife had
made payments on the car, they were both apparently equitable owners.
On the other hand, the wife had not worked for more than two years
prior to the accident, and all the evidence was to the effect that the
husband alone had maintained the car during that time. The majority
"0 Although the principal case is the first instance in which the court has been
asked to hold another member of the family under the doctrine for the negligence
of the head of the household, the majority of courts facing the issue have held such
member liable. E.g., .Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935);
Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N.W. 626 (1926) ; Smith v. Oversti'eet, 258
Ky. 781, 81 S.W.2d 571 (1935). But see Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126, 233
N.W. 805 (1930).
"6 See, e.g., Elliot v. Killian, 242 N.C. 471, 87 S.E.2d 903 (1955).
10 210 N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87 (1936).
27 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398 (1953).18Id. at 499, 78 S.E.2d at 404.
See, e.g., Smith v. Doyle, 98 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; Mortensen v. Knight,
81 Ariz. 325, 305 P.2d 463 (1956) ; Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126, 233 N.W.
805 (1930). But see Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935),
where the wife was held liable because she owned the car, even though her husband;
who was driving at the time of the accident, maintained and controlled it.
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opinion cited the Matthews case, which, as we have seen, declared that
the test for fixing liability under the family purpose doctrine was control.
Since the evidence dearly showed that the wife had not maintained the
car for more than two years prior to the accident and that the husband
was head of the household, it seems apparent that two of the important
factors in proving control in the wife were lacking. The only evidence
that plaintiff presented to establish control of the car in the wife was the
not very convincing testimony of the defendant's husband: "Yes, my
wife drives. She uses the car and I use the car too .... I could use
the car anytime that I wanted to."' 20 In allowing the case to go to the
jury on this extremely weak showing of control, it would appear that
the court went beyond established boundaries of the family purpose doc-
trine as applied in North Carolina. Apparently, under the theory of the
principal case, a showing of little more than legal title in the defendant
will take a case to the jury under the doctrine.
As has been noted, the family member who maintains the car may
be held liable, and the principal case holds an equitable owner liable
under the doctrine. In a proper case, could the equitable owner and the
maintainer be joined on the theory that each exercised some control over
the automobile? In Cronenberg v. United States,21 a federal case apply-
ing North Carolina law, the government filed a cross-claim against the
parents of the minor co-defendant who was driving his mother's car, as
joint tort-feasors under the doctrine. G.S. § 20-71.1, presuming agency
on proof of ownership, was used against the wife to establish a prima
facie case. The judge, sitting as a jury, found the question of both
parents' liability under the doctrine to be an issue of fact which he re-
solved in their favor on the ground that the car was not used for family
purposes. Since the statute only creates a rule of evidence, this holding
assumes that, in legal theory, both parents could have been held re-
sponsible under the family purpose doctrine. Thus in North Carolina it
may be that it is possible to recover from both where one family-member
owns the car and another maintains it.2 2 Under the approach of the
principal case, only a slight showing of control in each party is necessary
to take the case to the jury against him.
As has been indicated, the family purpose doctrine is an extension
of respondeat superior. It came into being as an instrument of social
policy to afford greater protection for the rapidly growing number of
20 250 N.C. at 572, 108 S.E.2d at 853.
123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
2 On this point the authorities are in direct conflict. The leading case of
Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913), held both husband and
wife on the theory of joint ownership, and Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64,
160 S.E. 303 (1931), held both because the wife owned and the husband main-
tained the car. Contra, Smith v. Overstreet, 258 Ky. 781, 81 S.W.2d 571 (1935).
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motorists in the United States. The principal case seems to indicate
that the court, in furtherance of the basic policy of the doctrine, does
not wish to impair its utility by imposing technical standards for its use.
Thus, from Small v. Mallory it may be inferred that if there is any
evidence of control in the defendant, it will be sufficient to withstand
his motion of nonsuit on the issue of liability under the family purpose
doctrine.
JAcK W. FLOYD
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Denial of Confrontation to
Witnesses in Loyalty-Security Hearings
The issue of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in
loyalty-security hearings was presented to the United States Supreme
Court in the recent case of Greene v. McElroy.' Greene was an aero-
nautical engineer employed as general manager and vice-president of a
private corporation which was doing classified research for the Navy
under contract. Such contracts incorporated by reference2 a condition
that the contractor was to exclude from the job all persons not cleared
for access to classified information.
Although Greene had been previously cleared,3 the corporation was
notified by the Secretary of the Navy in April 1953 that his clearance
was revoked and that he was to be denied access to any classified in-
formation. This led to Greene's discharge. He appealed to the Eastern
Industrial Personnel Security Board (EIPSB), and a hearing was held
at which he was subjected to intense cross-examination by the board
without the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
4
EIPSB affirmed the order of revocation and this action was affirmed by
1360 U.S. 474 (1959).
2 All government contracts for classified work incorporated by reference the
Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 66 (1954).
' Greene was given a Confidential clearance by the Army in August 1949, a Top
Secret clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Military District of Washing-
ton in November 1949, and a Top Secret clearance by the Air Materiel Command
in February 1950. 360 U.S. at 476 n.1. In 1951 Greene's clearance was withdrawn
but was restored by the Industrial Employment Review Board (IERB) in 1952.
In 1953 the Secretary of Defense abolished the Personnel Security Board (PSB)
and the IERB and directed the Secretaries of the three armed services to establish
Regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards. 360 U.S. at 480.
'The revocation of Greene's security clearance was based primarily on incidents
occurring between 1942 and 1947. It was during this period that Greene was living
with his former wife who was alleged to have been an ardent Communist. The
fact that he stayed with her until 1947 seems to be the main reason that the
government suspected that he was a security risk. 360 U.S. at 490. Greene testi-
fied that the main reason for the divorce was that his ex-wife held views with which
he did not concur and was friendly with persons with whom he had little in com-
mon. 360 U.S. at 479. From a review of the record it appears that Greene's
clearance was revoked because of his association with his wife.
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the Industrial Personnel Security Review Board (IPSRB) in 1956.
Greene then started his action in the federal courts.5 On appeal the
Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question concerning the right
of confrontation, and reversed on other grounds the decisions of the
lower courts, which had affirmed the IPSRB ruling.1
In proceedings other than security hearings, where disclosure of
sources of information does not endanger national security, the problems
of confrontation and cross-examination are less acute. Thus, in the
field of criminal law the sixth amendment explicitly secures the right
of confrontation in the federal courts in any case where disclosure of
the informant's identity, or the contents of his communication are rele-
vant to the defense.8  Though the right is less definite in state criminal
Before an employee can get a decision in the federal courts he must first
show that the court has jurisdiction. In the type of case under discussion this
involves two important things. First, he must show that he has a right which
has been violated. In this situation the due process clause of the fifth amendment
is usually invoked to show that a property right has been taken without due process
of law. In the case of government employees there is a question as to whether
the right to employment is a property right. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd inen. by at equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
In the case of the private employee there is the question of whether a security
clearance is a mere privilege to be taken away without procedural due process or
a property right like the license to practice a profession. EX parle Robinson, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 187 Pac. 965(1920); People ex rel. State Bd. of Health v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N.E. 786
(1888). Secondly, he must show that the issue is justiciable, i.e., that it is a matter
which the courts should and are able to decide, and not a question which can
best be determined by the political departments of the government. The problem
of justiciability has been much discussed by the courts in security type cases.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Adams v. Humphry,
232 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Bailey v. Richardson, supra; Harmon v. Brucker,
137 F. Supp. 475 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 579 (1958).
'The district court in Greene v. Wilson, 150 F. Supp. 958 (D.D.C. 1957),
denied Greene's motion for summary judgment and granted the government's same
motion on the ground that Greene had shown no invasion of his rights. This
was affirmed in Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), with the hold-
ing that it was not a justiciable controversy because it was an executive decision
as to whether a person was fitted to be assigned to a particular kind of confidential
work. This decision is criticized in Note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 828 (1958).
' The basis of the decision was that there had been no explicit authority from
the President or Congress for the Department of Defense to fashion and apply
an industrial security program which denied the procedural safeguards of con-
frontation and cross-examination. In the absence of explicit authorization the
Court was not willing to find authority for such restraint on the traditional forms
of a fair proceeding. The Court also said it was not necessary at this time to
decide whether such procedures, where explicitly authorized, would be consti-
tutional. 360 U.S. at 580.
' Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1 (1953). In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held
that even the reports in the files of the F.B.I. must be turned over to the accused
for his use in preparing a defense when such reports contain relevant statements
of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the
trial of the accused. Shortly after this decision Congress passed the Anti-Jencks
Act, 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958), which was enacted to place
limits on the accused and prevent him from making fishing expeditions into the
F.B.I. files hoping to find helpful information.
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proceedings,9 the Court has held that a denial of the right of confronta-
tion in a state proceedings is a denial of due process under the fourteenth
amendment.'0 In the area of civil court proceedings the problem of con-
frontation has presented little difficulty as it has been dealt with ade-
quately by the "hearsay rule" and an established right of cross-exam-
ination.:" Finally, in the field of administrative hearings where there
is no question of the national security being endangered, the parties have
the full right of confrontation and cross-examination both in federal
and state proceedings.' 2
The "cold war" situation has provided some execptions to the ele-
ments of procedural due process which heretofore have been applied as
a matter of course. The rationale of any resulting deprivation of per-
sonal rights lies in the balancing of national security against individual
rights1 3 The due process provisions of the Constitution are not defini-
tive terms by which it can be said that one certain act is a denial of due
process while another is not. Rather they are applied in the light of the
entire situation.' 4  With the cold war in the background it is not in-
conceivable that the Court will hold that the denial of confrontation is not
a denial of due process where the national security is involved. 15 Much
more than this has been done under the war powers,' 6 and the exigency
of the cold war might likewise be deemed such as to warrant denial of
some procedural rights in the interest of national security.
Thus far the rule that the Supreme Court will avoid all constitutional
8 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).1ot re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). But cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953), where petitioner alleged denial of due process when a confession
of a co-defendant was used against the petitioner who did not have the opportunity
to confront because the co-defendant did not take the witness stand. The Court held
that the right of the co-defendant not to testify was greater than the petitioner's
right to confrontation. However, since this case the Court has reiterated its former
position. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Compare Williams v. NewYork, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), where the Court held that it was not a denial of due
process for the trial court to use confidential information in passing sentence because
the right of confrontation goes only to the establishment of guilt.115 WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
"
2Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Carter v. Kubler, 320 U.S. 243
(1943); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S.190 (1933). See also Larche v. Hannah, 176 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. La. 1959), where
the court followed the principal case in that since the Civil Rights Commission
had not been explicitly authorized to adopt rules that denied confrontation, in-
vestigating state vote registrars without allowing the registrars to face their ac-
cusers was illegal.
3 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
", Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165(1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455(1942). Compare Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
" See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
"0U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214(1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
19601
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questions if there is another ground in which a decision may rest,7 has
prevented the Court's determination of the question of whether a person
has a constitutional right of confrontation and cross-examination in ad-
ministrative hearings where it is contended that the national security
would be endangered by divulging the source of the information on which
the government bases its charge or decision. The decisions in this area
have usually turned on the construction of a departmental regulation or,
as in the principal case, its authorization.
The issue of confrontation and cross-examination was before the
Court in Bailey v. Richardson,"' where a government employee was
fired for security reasons without being given the opportunity to face or
cross-examine her accusers at the security hearing. And, as typical
in this type of case, the identify of the informant was withheld not
only from the employee, but also from the members of the hearing board
who had to judge its probative value. The Court of Appeals held that
the sixth amendment did not apply because its application is limited
to criminal actions where the accused may be punished,19 and that the
fifth amendment did not apply because government employment is a
privilege, not a property right, nor "life" nor "liberty." The court also
said, "Never in our history has a government administrative employee
been entitled to a hearing of the quasi-judicial type upon his dismissal
from government service." 20 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision
by an equally divided Court without a written opinion.21 This is the
only case that holds that an employee at a security hearing does not have
the right to confront his accusers. In all the recent cases which in-
volved security-dismissals, including the principal case, the Court has
found other grounds on which to reverse the lower courts' decision up-
holding dismissal. 22
There are several different views concerning the right of confronta-
tion in security hearings that have been advanced extrajudicially. 23 One
view is that there should be no right of confrontation because to allow
it would unnecessarily endanger the national security.24 It is argued
x, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of
Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
2' 341 U.S. 918 (1951), aflrming mere. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
19 182 F.2d at 55. The dissent took the view that a dismissal for disloyalty is
punishment and requires all the safeguards of a judicial trial. Id. at 69.
20 Id. at 57.
21 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
2 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536
(1956) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
2 3Krasnowiecki, Confrontation by Witnesses in Government Employee Se-
curity Proceeding, 33 NOTRE DAME LAw. 180 (1958), gives a good summary of
the reasons most commonly advanced against disclosure.
2' The most noted exponent of this doctrine of complete non-disclosure is the
Director of F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover. For a discussion of the Director's views
and reasons, see McKay, The Right of Confrontation, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 122(1959).
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in support of this view (1) that professional informants must be pro-
tected if the effectiveness of their work is to be unimpaired; (2) that the
casual informant would not volunteer his adverse testimony if required
to do it openly; and (3) that in any event, the use of confidental in-
formants is not unfair to the person who by his own conduct has cre-
ated a doubt as to his loyalty to this country and who, therefore, should
not expect the nation, or its responsible officials, to gamble national
security on his continued status.25 The difficulty with these arguments
is that they assume that there are no other ways to insure a continued
inflow of information which bears on national security but by the use of
undisclosed informers, and that the employee is guilty as charged and
therefore entitled to no procedural rights. Also it is difficult to say that
one by his own conduct has created a doubt as to his loyalty when in fact
it is the conduct or word of the faceless informer which has created the
doubt. If there is no right of confrontation the word of the undisclosed
informant is allowed to create a presumption of disloyalty and the em-
ployee must rebut the presumption by guessing what the basis of the
charge is and then defend himself before a hearing board which most
often does not know the source or reliability of the evidence against the
employee.
Another view is that the employee should have the right to con-
front the casual informant, but not the professional informant.2 6 The
difficulty with this view is obvious; there is no practical way to deter-
mine who is "casual" and who is "professional." Where would you
place the man who works without charge but who constantly gives in-
formation? Furthermore, who is to make the decision? If left with
the investigatory agency in charge, any doubt would probably be re-
solved in favor of security and against the individual as has been the
marked tendency throughout the total operation of the security programs.
It would seem that whether the derogatory information comes from a
casual or professional informant should not be important when the ques-
tion of the constitutional right of confrontation is being considered. The
basic issue remains the same, and this suggested compromise does not
change that issue. The issue for consideration is how such information
is used against the employee at the hearing.
A third view is an alternative to confrontation. Its premise is that
the hearing officer or board should conduct an in camera proceeding
and examine informants privately for the purpose of satisfying them-
" This is the reason advanced by a special committee of the American Bar
Association for its position on the question. U.S. CommIssioN ox GOVERNMENT
SEcURITY, RORT 661 (1957).
"This is the view approved by the Commission on Government Security.
Id. at 668, 670. Proposed legislation adopting this view has been introduced
in Congress, S. 2314, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), to replace the present industrial
security program invalidated by the principal case.
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selves as to the reliability of such informants and the truthfulness of the
information they furnish.2 7  This view provides for an unbiased party
to have access to the true basis of the disloyalty charge.28 However, this
view does not meet the issue. It would seem that a third party confront-
ing the informant would not satisfy the reason for the constitutional right
of confrontation, if there is such a right. The accused has a great ad-
vantage over any third party in examining the accuser to determine the
truth, for he will know if and when the informant is lying and by cross-
examination can show this to be a fact.
The fourth view is one which would do away with any practice that
denies the right of confrontation.29 In support of this view it is argued
that if an informant is not willing to testify openly and subject his
reliability to the test of cross-examination, his statement should not be
used to damage another person. It is further argued that the informant
can be used by the investigatory agency to develop leads to independent
evidence 0 that can be disclosed at a subsequent hearing. By this view
the accused would have adequate personal safeguards, and at the same
time the government could conceal the identity of the informant and
thereby maintain his effectiveness. In essence this would parallel the
rule now followed in criminal prosecutions. The difficulty with these
arguments is that in the situation where the only evidence available is
that possessed by the informant the government must either compromise
the effectiveness of future sources of information to the possible detri-
ment of national security or let the alleged security risk remain at his job.
By way of summary it should be pointed out that the first view
assumes that there is no constitutional right of confrontation. The second
and third views appear to be nothing more than compromises in avoid-
ance of the issue. It is only the fourth view that assumes that there is
such a right.
There are many indications that when the constitutional issue of con-
frontation is decided by the Court the decision will be that the denial
27 This policy is used by the Atomic Energy Commission to some extent as
expressed in the revised regulations issued in May of 1956. U.S. Commissrox ON
GOVERNMENT SECURiTy, REPORT 663 (1957); 10 C.F.R. § 4.27(m) (1959).
2" The merits of an it camera proceeding are discussed in Note, 45 CALIF. L.
R v. 524 (1957).
9 This view is supported by the American Jewish Congress. U.S. CommissioN
oN GOVERNMENT SEcuRITY, REPORT 662 (1957).
30 To appreciate the practicality of this argument it is important to know the
sufficiency of evidence necessary to sustain a security dismissal. It need not be a
preponderance of the evidence as in civil litigation, nor must it be beyond a reason-
able doubt as in criminal cases. It is something less than either of these. "Clear-
ance shall be denied or revoked if it is determined, on the basis of all the availableinformation, that access to classified information by the person concerned is not
clearly consistent with the interest of the national security." 32 C.F.R. § 67.3-1(Supp. 1959). (Emphasis added.) The same standard is applied to government
employees. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). For an inter-
pretation of this standard see Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1955).
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of such an important procedural right is a violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. While the majority in Jay v. Boyd, a
deportation case, held the issue to be non-justiciable, four dissenting
justices reached the issue and supported such a right in strong lan-
guage.3 1 Also, in the principal case the Court went much further in its
language expounding on such rights than was necessary in making the
decision arrived at.
Certain principals have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is im-
portant in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more im-
portant where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers
or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, preju-
dice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the
requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have
ancient roots .... This Court has been zealous to protect these
rights from erosion. It has been spoken out not only in criminal
cases . . .but also in all types of cases where administrative and
regulatory action were under scrutiny.
3 2
The Court also quoted Wigmore0 to the effect that there is no
safeguard for the testing of human statements comparable to that fur-
31351 U.S. 345 (1956). (Warren, C. J., dissenting at 362) "Such a hearing
[as Jay had] is not an administrative hearing in the American sense of the term.
It is no hearing .... To me, this is not due process.... I am unwilling to write
such a departure from American standards into the judicial or administrative
process or to impute to Congress an intention to do so in the absence of much
clearer language than it has used here." (Black, J., dissenting at 365, 366) "No
nation can remain true to the ideal of liberty under law and at the same time permit
people to have their homes destroyed and their lives blasted by slurs of unseen
and unsworn informers. There is no possible way to contest the truthfulness of
anonymous accusations. The supposed accuser can neither be identified nor inter-
rogated. He may be the most worthless and irresponsible character in the com-
munity. What he said may be wholly malicious, untrue, unreliable, or inaccurately
reported. In a court of law the triers of fact could not even listen to such gossip,
much fess decide the most trifling issue on it .... Article III of our Constitution
and the Bill of Rights intended that people shall not have valuable rights and priv-
ileges taken away from them by government unless the deprivation occurs after
some kind of court proceeding where witnesses can be confronted and questioned
and where the public can know that the rights of individuals are being protected"
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting at 373) "In this country, if someone dislikes you, or
accused you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. He
cannot assassinate you or your character from behind, without suffering the pen-
alties an outraged citizenry will impose." (Douglas, J., dissenting at 375, 376)
"Fairness, implicit in our notions of due process, requires that any hearing be
full and open with an opportunity to know the charge, and the accusers, to reply
to the charge, and to meet the accusers .... A hearing is not a hearing in the
American sense if faceless informers or confidential information may be used to
deprive a man of his liberty."
360 U.S. at 496.
Id. at 497, citing 5 WIGMoRE, EvMEN cE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940).
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nished by cross-examination and that no statement should be used as
testimony until it has undergone that test. This seems to indicate that
the Court is of the opinion that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is a basic right guaranteed under the Constitution and
when the question is met it will so hold. The dissent in the principal
case was of this opinion when it said: "While the Court disclaims de-
ciding this constitutional question, no one reading the opinion will doubt
that the explicit language of its broad sweep speaks in prophecy. '8 4
There is much more involved than the accused employee's right to
work.a5 It is submitted that there is a right not to have unchallenged
and unverified suspicion and contempt with their concomitant social
and economic disadvantage cast upon an individual and his family. This
writer suggests that the due process clause does require the accused be
given an opportunity to face his accusers and to cross-examine them,
and that a decision by the Court to this effect would be fully warranted.
OLIVER W. ALPHiN
Constitutional Law-Right To Travel and Area Restrictions-
Foreign Relations Power
Worthy v. Herter1 involved a newspaperman who was denied a re-
newal 2 of his passport when he would not agree to comply with the area
restrictions3 stamped on it. The issue presented was whether the Secre-
tary of State had the power to prevent the travel of a law-abiding United
States citizen to certain areas of the world in a time when the nation
is not at war. The federal district court dismissed the action which
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Secretary
of State. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
3 4 Id. at 524.
11 The writer has made no distinction in his discussion between the rights of
private and government employees. It is submitted that there is no valid distinction
to be made. Both require security clearances; the effect of dismissal is the same;
the constitutional guarantees appear to be the same. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Trauax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), with Slochower v.
Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183(1952). The danger to national security is the same, Parker v. Lester, 112 F.
Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), and each is in fact engaged in government work, often
at the same place.
1270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
'It appears that Worthy had traveled to Hungary and Communist China on his
previous passport. This would explain why the State Department took occasion
to ask Worthy about his intended use of a renewed passport.
At the present time the following inscription is stamped in U.S. passports:
"This passport is not valid for travel to the following areas under control of
authorities with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations: Al-
bania, Bulgaria, and those portions of China, Korea and Viet Nam under Com-
munist control." Hearings Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on De-
partment of State Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as 1957 Hearings].
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and concluded that the Secretary did have such power both statutorily
and inherently within the executive control of foreign relations.4 The
Supreme Court denied petition for certiorari. 5
The individual's freedom of movement, the right to leave one's own
country and go to any other, is the interest for which the court's pro-
tection was sought in the Worthy case. The idea that an individual
is free to move from place to place in the world, barring war or criminal
indictment, has very old roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Magna
Charta first guaranteed the right in 1215: "It shall be lawful in future for
anyone.., to leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land
and water, except for a short period in time of war ... ."6 The only
limitation imposed upon this freedom by the King was the ancient writ
of ne exeat regno7 ("let him not leave the realm"). Apparently this
writ still survives in England today, but its use in the name of the
Crown seems definitely restricted to times of war.8
The right to travel finds expression in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted in the General Assembly of the United Nations,
December 10, 1948. Article 13 provides: "1. Everyone has the right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country."
9
Contemporary writers agree that freedom to travel is a natural
right and that its unfettered exercise is in the best interest of a free
and self-enlightening society.10 The fact that no specific mention is
made of the right in the United States Constitution has usually been in-
terpreted by writers in this field to mean that it was regarded as un-
challenged, basic, and essential."' Freedom to travel has been intimately
associated with other American freedoms. Protection of a property in-
'The scope of this note in intended to extend primarily to a discussion of
the foreign relations power of the United States Government and how it bears
on freedom to travel. The passport problem itself is only incidental to this dis-
cussion. For a more complete treatment of the passport cases and authorities per
se see Note, 37 N.C.L. RFv. 172 (1958).
361 U.S. 918 (1959).0 Clause 42 of the Magna Charta of 1215. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA
AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 240 (1900). Although this clause was
left out of Magna Charta after 1215, it has been argued that the broad grant of lib-
erty contained in it represented the common law, which, according to one authority,
recognized the right of everyone to leave the kingdom at his pleasure. BEAMES,
NE ExEAT REGNO, A BRIEF VIEW OF THE WRIT (1st Am. ed. 1821).
" BEAmES, op. cit. supra, note 6.
'VII HALsBuRY, LAws OF ENGLAND 293-94 (3d ed. 1954).
'3 DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 960-61 (Chafee ed. 1952).
10 See CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION (1956); Mc-
Dougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Coinrunity, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. SocIETY 490 (1949) ; Note, Passports and Freedom of Travel, 41 GEO.
L.J. 63 (1952).
"J affe, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
17-20 (1950).
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terest, for example, may be involved where travel abroad is essential to
a person's livelihood. A religious calling may require a person to travel
overseas. The "right to know," to be informed about other lands and
peoples, depends on the basic freedom of international mobility.
In recent history the right to travel has been recognized by two im-
portant cases, Shactman v. Dulles'2 and Kent v. Dulles."8 In Shactnman
the appellant had been denied a passport in the "best interests of the
country" because he was the head of an organization on the Attorney
General's list of subversive groups. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held the denial was an arbitrary restraint on the indi-
vidual's liberty and ordered that the passport be issued.
The right to travel, to go from place to place ... is a natural
right subject to the rights of others and to reasonable regulation
under law. A restraint imposed by the Government of the United
States upon this liberty, therefore, must conform with the pro-
visions of the Fifth Amendment that 'no person shall be . . .
deprived of. .. liberty.. . without due process of law."14
In Kent v. Dulles'5 the Supreme Court recognized this right and stated
that it is a part of the "liberty" guaranteed by the fifth amendment, and
therefore it may not be infringed without due process of law.10 In Kent
the Court held that the Secretary has no statutory authority to deny
passports on the basis of political beliefs or associations. 17
The problem in the principal case is a new one to the courts but not
to American citizens. In the 1930's the first positive area restrictions
were imposed on United States citizens through passport control. Travel
to Ethiopia was prohibited in 1935, and to Spain during the Civil War
of 1936-39,18 and to China in 1937.19 Apparently these travel restric-
tions were never challenged, one possible explanation being that travel
without a passport was still possible to some extent. Furthermore the
11225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
13 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
111225 F.2d at 941.
357 U.S. 116 (1958). Here the passport denial rested on Communist affilia-
tion and refusal to sign the non-Communist affidavit. The Court met squarely the
issue of the Secretary of State's discretion over issuance of passports under exist-
ing statutes. Since the right to travel is an element of liberty protected by the fifth
amendment, the Court points out, Congress alone has the power to establish sub-
stantive grounds for denial of passports, which are now regarded as essential to
travel abroad. The Court found that Congress bad intended that a person might
be refused a passport only if his citizenship was in question or if he was accused of
a crime.
18 357 U.S. at 125.
27 Id. at 128, 130.132 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 406A (2d rev. ed. 1945).
193 HACxWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 532 (1942). It is interesting
to note that in all three of these periods a war was in progress within the coun-
try to which travel was prohibited. At the time of the passport denial in the
principal case no war was in progress on the Chinese mainland.
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area restrictions, with the exception of those relating to Spain, were of
short duration.
The "cold war" following World War II and the emergence of Red
China have presented the United States government with difficult prob-
lems in the conduct of foreign relations. While trying to establish an
equilibrium and to normalize its relations with the older part of the Com-
munist world, i.e., Soviet Russia, the government has officially ignored
the newer Communist countries. Out of this situation has arisen the
latest governmental policy of forbidding travel in countries whose gov-
ernments are not recognized by the United States.20  In May 1952 the
Department of State began stamping passports invalid for the U.S.S.R.,
China, and the Soviet satellite states except on special application to
the Department.21 Then in October 1955 Russia and most of her satel-
lites22 were opened to travel; but all passports were stamped with the
statement that they were not valid for travel to Albania, Bulgaria, and
those portions of China, Korea, and Viet Nam under Communist con-
trol.2
Recently a Congressman interested in traveling in the Far East to
obtain information regarding United States relations and policies in that
area was denied a passport for Red China.24 In the State Department
letter denying the Congressman's request several basic tenets under-
lying the China travel ban were revealed-namely, the existence of "a
state of unresolved conflict" stemming from the Korean action, lack of
diplomatic relations, inability "to provide the customary protection," and
the maltreatment of Americans on the mainland. More significant, how-
ever, is the statement that the Congressman's presence in China might
be taken for a change in policy.2 5
The rationale of area retrictions has most often been stated in terms
of the local dangers to the traveler and the lack of diplomatic channels
through which to extricate him from detention.20 These criteria have
not been applied uniformly. In 1957, for example, the ban was lifted for
"' In the case of Soviet Russia after 1923 and before United States recognition,
there was no travel ban. 1957 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65.211957 Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65.
"Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
23 See note 3 supra.
2, The district court in dismissing Porter v. Herter, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C.
1959), cited Worthy and refused to find a difference between an ordinary citizen
and a Congressman travelling in an unofficial capacity. A petition for writ of
certiorari has been denied. 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
5 Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary, to the Hon.
Charles 0. Porter, House of Representatives, July 2, 1959. (Exhibit B in the
complaint of Porter v. Herter, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1959).)
2 SPECIAL COmmITTEE To STUDY PASSPORT PROCEDURES OF THE AssoCIATIoN
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF Nmv YORK, FREEDOM TO TRAVEL 53 (1959) [herein-
after cited as FREEDOM To TRAVEL].
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short visits to Albania 7 and Bulgaria28 by persons with compelling pro-
fessional reasons. In the case of Red China, three classes of persons
have been granted passports valid for travel to that country. The first
group consisted of the mothers and one brother of three Americans held
prisoners there.29 Also a lawyer representing defendants charged with
sedition was permitted to go to China in order to gather data for their
defense.30 The largest group receiving the Secretary's approval con-
sisted of twenty-four newsmen, specially selected on the basis of their
papers' foreign news coverage,31 who were authorized to stay in Red
China for six months. These exceptions indicate that the State De-
partment's prime object is the success of its foreign policy and not the
safety of individual Americans.
This rationale finds expression in the Worthy opinion, where the
court approves another reason for imposing area restrictions, namely
the prevention of possible "clashes" caused by Americans in "trouble
spots" of the world.32 - The decision rests on statutory authority and on
the President's executive power in the foreign relations field. "It is
settled that in respect to foreign affairs the President has the power of
action and the courts will not attempt to review the merits of what he
does. The President is the nation's organ in and for foreign affairs."38
"We think the designation of certain areas of the world as forbidden to
American travelers falls within the power to conduct foreign affairs. 384
This language of the court suggests two inter-related concepts of
American constitutional law, the foreign relations power and the political
question doctrine.
The "foreign relations power" refers to the ability of the United
States government to carry on official intercourse with other nations. 5
The Constitution makes no specific grant of a "foreign relations power."
Rather it allocates to the President the treaty-making function, the
power to appoint and receive diplomatic agents, and the command of the
army and navy.3 6 The Constitution grants to Congress the power (1) to
establish and collect customs and duties, (2) to regulate foreign com-
merce, (3) to establish naturalization laws, (4) to declare war, and
(5) to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
2 Washington Post and Times Herald, Nov. 15, 1957, § A, p. 12, col. 4.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1957, p. 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
" N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1957, p. 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
" The lawyer was Mr. A. L. Wirin. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1957, p. 17, col. 1
(city ed.).
" N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1957, p. 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
3" 270 F.2d at 910.
33 Id. at 911.
3" Id. at 910.
"United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
"U.S. Coh¢sT. art. II, § 2.
[Vol. 38
NOTES AND COMMENTS
seas and offenses against the law of nations.3 7 These powers collec--
tively make up the constitutional authority for the regulation of the
country's conduct in respect to other nations.
In 1829 to the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson38 first announced
the "political question" doctrine which precludes judicial interference
with governmental action concerning foreign policy. The case dealt with
Spanish lands in the southeastern part of the country. Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking for the Court, declared:
If those departments which are entrusted with the foreign
intercourse of the nation . . . have unequivocally asserted its
rights over a country . . . which it claims under a treaty; if the
legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not
in its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A ques-
tion like this respecting the boundaries of nations is . . . more
a political than a legal question, and in its discussion, the courts
... must respect the pronounced will of the legislature.3 9
Labelling presidential or congressional action concerning foreign rela-
tions as a "political question," however, does not prevent the court's
looking behind the label, as was done in Worthy.40 The court may ex-
amine what was done in the name of foreign relations or foreign policy,
particularly where the claim is made that constitutional rights have been
infringed.41
When some action of the federal government is under consideration,
the problem before the court is determining what is properly within the
field of foreign relations. It is not an easy determination to make, be-
cause the limits of this power are nowhere defined. The Constitution
in broad terms mentions a few specific powers in the field; significantly,
these constituitonal grants are made both to the President and to Con-
gress. One writer has suggested that the co-existence of these affirma-
tive constitutional grants has assured a struggle between the President
and Congress for the privilege of directing the country's foreign policy.
42
Undoubtedly the President has won the lion's share of the privilege,
43
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8827 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
30 Id. at 309.
40 270 F.2d at 909.
' Although there are no decided cases having to do with an executive invasion
of personal rights as a by-product of the foreign relations power, the point is made
by one writer that the President's acts should be no less subject to judicial review
than are acts of Congress. Carrington, Political Questions: The Tudicial Check
on the Exceutive, 42 VA. L. REv. 175, 184 (1956).
"CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERs 171 (4th ed. 1957).
"The Senate was intended to exercise a special role in the conduct of our
foreign relations, acting like a council in which the "President in Council" could
work out policies and have diplomatic appointments approved. Subsequent events
did not develop this role, and the words "with the advice and consent of the
Senate" have come to mean little more than the power of ratification or veto of
presidential treaty proposals. If, however, the Senate has lost power, certainly
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and it is the presidential exercise of the foreign relations power which
is most often the object of complaint before the courts. The subjects
dealt with in the cases can be classified as follows: (1) recognition
of foreign governments, 44 (2) assessment of treaty obligations, 4 (3)
resolution of disputed sovereigns, 46 (4) acquisition of new lands,4 7 (5)
participation in ad hoc international bodies, 48 (6) the making of interna-
tional executive agreements,49 and (7) the licensing of domestic carriers
for foreign air routes.50 Not all of these situations involve purely execu-
ive functions; for example, congressional involvement was necessary in
the new lands and international organization cases. Furthermore an act
3f Congress underlay the situation in the foreign air routes case. It
would seem that the plenary power of the President in the field of foreign
relations, so far as the cases are concerned, is fairly limited to recogni-
tion, executive agreements with other governments, and treaty interpre-
tation. None of these traditional subjects was at issue in the principal
case, yet the court has found that the Secretary of State's action in im-
posing area controls is protected by the presidential "power to conduct
foreign affairs."
In the principal case statutory authority, quite apart from the Presi-
dent's inherent power, was held to be equally decisive of the question of
the power of the Secretary of State. Two statutes were found by the
court to be controlling. First, section 211(a) of the basic passport act
of 1926 gives the Secretary of State authority to "grant and issue pass-
the President and to a lesser extent Congress as a whole have gained power. The
task of the President is to formulate and propose the nation's plans for dealing
officially with other nations. The Congress is in a position to support or modify
these plans through control of appropriations and through passage of statutes
governing United States participation in international organizations. See CoRwiN,
op. cit. supra note 42, at 170-226. The recently proposed Bricker Amendment was
an attempt to invest Congress with a larger role in the actual conduct of the country's
international relations. Specifically the proposed amendment was aimed at the
treaty making power and would require action by both houses of Congress, just
as in the.case of any other legislation, lbefore a treaty would become binding as
law. The effect of such a provision would undoubtedly be to reverse the trend of
concentrating the direction of the nation's foreign affairs in the hands of the
President. Congress, however, wisely refused to pass the proposal. See Whitton
and Fowler, Bricker Amendnent-Fallacies and Dangers, 48 Am. J. INT. L. 23(1953); Henkin, The Law of the Land and Foreignr Relations, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv.
403 (1959).
"United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
"It re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892) ; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S.(13 Pet.) 415 (1839) ; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
"Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1796).
,"Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907).
"Koki v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949) (establishment of war crimes tri-
bunal); Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd, 311 U.S. 740 (1941) (Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Ger-
many).
"' United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 382 (1950).
'0 Chicago & So. Airlines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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ports ... under such rules as the President shall designate and pre-
scribe . ."51 Secondly, section 1185(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 195252 provides the President with power to declare
a national emergency and makes it unlawful during the declared emer-
gency for American citizens to depart or enter the country without a valid
passport. Under authority of section 211(a) the President in 1938 issued
an executive orderO enabling the Secretary of State in his discretion to
restrict the use of passports on a geographic basis.54 A national emer-
gency now exists by virtue of the President's 1953 proclamation,55
thus activating section 1185(b). The court held that the effect of these
statutes and orders is to grant the Secretary of State a discretionary
power to prohibit travel of Americans to certain areas of the world by
making the passport invalid for use in those areas.
The statutes relied on would appear to be insufficient to sustain so
broad a discretion in the Secretary of State in the issuance of passports.
Both section 211(a) and the executive order issued pursuant to it and
section 1185(b) were strictly construed in Kent v. Dulles50 as not
giving the Secretary "unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a pass-
port from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose." In
Kent passport denial by the Secretary was based on the applicant's
political associations and beliefs, and this was held to be a substantive
ground not available to the Secretary under existing statutes. An area
restriction would certainly be a substantive ground for denial equally
unavailable without statutory authority.
The language of the Worthy opinion indicates that the existence
of a national emergency extended the scope of section 2 11(a) to include
area restrictions under the power of the President to prescribe rules and
regulations governing passport issuance. 57 The Supreme Court in Kent,
however, was not constrained to expand the Secretary's 211(a) author-
ity, implemented by executive order, on account of an emergency falling
short of war.58 It is submitted that the government's power was over-
reached in Worthy because: (1) section 211(a) and section 1185(b)
do not provide the substantive rules on which passport denial can be
based, and clearly to restrain citizens from going to certain areas of the
144 Stat. 87 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1952).
566 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1952).
='Exec. Order No. 7856 (1938), 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938).
'"§ 51.75. Refusal to issue passport. The Secretary of State is authorized
in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only
in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to with-
draw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain coun-
tries." Ibid.
" Proclamation No. 3004, 67 Stat. c.31 (1953).
r6357 U.S. 116 (1958).
11 270 F.2d at 912.
r8 357 U.S. at 128.
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world is to impose a substantive regulation; (2) the issue of whether
the foreign relations power includes the power in the President to im-
pose area restrictions on individual travel has never been passed upon
by the courts. Furthermore the exercise of the foreign relations power
by the President where it touches personal liberties is subject to the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.59 Under the Kent decision
due process requires an act of Congress to circumscribe the right to
travel.
When the President needs additional powers to carry out the legiti-
mate policies of the government, the customary approach is through the
use of special purpose legislation.60 Where the powers asked for will
infringe basic individual rights, the Congress of course should be certain
the powers are essential and reasonable and that the grant of power is
limited in scope and duration. The current need arises from the
difficulties of carrying out the government's over-all "cold war" policies.
These policies include non-recognition of China, limiting socio-economic
intercourse with the Soviet world, and the military objective of contain-
ing Communist influences throughout the world.61 The President has
said that if these policies are to be successful, then the Secretary of
State must have authority to impose area restrictions on United States
citizens abroad. 62  He asked Congress to provide the needed legislation.
Such legislation has been recommended by a special committee of the
New York Bar studying passport procedures. 3 Whether area restric-
"' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) ; Shact-
man v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).60 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 42, at 191-92.
Statement by Under Secretary of State Murphy before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, April 2, 1957, 1957 Hearings, op. cit. smpra note 3, at 69;
President's Special Message to Congress, July 7, 1958, 104 CONG. REc. 1832-33
(1958) ; see generally Rostow, American Foreign Policy and International Law,
17 LA. L. REv. 552 (1957).
" President's Special Message to Congress of July 7, 1958, 104 CoNG. REc.
1832-33 (1958). "[T]he secretary should have clear statutory authority to prevent
Americans from using passports for travel to areas where there is no means of
protecting them, or where their presence would conflict with our foreign policy
objectives or be inimical to the security of the United States."
6 'iWithin the area of foreign affairs, the United States has the powers of a
sovereign State and these powers, no matter how divided between them, are vested
in total in the Congress and the President, subject of course to the provisions of
the Constitution. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Congress in 22
U.S.C. § 211a . . . has provided a legislative foundation for executive action,
it is clear that the Congress and the President, acting in concert, may restrict the
travel of Americans to certain areas of the world . . . . The present national
emergency becomes the reason and the occasion for the imposition of restrictions
on the travel of Americans into specified areas, as an instrument in the conduct
of the cold war. The Committee adopts this view in full consciousness that it may
result in restricting the travel of all Americans to certain countries in the national
interest of the United States .... Because of its nature, the restriction on travel
to certain countries or areas should be employed only in situations of gravity and
seriousness.
"[T]he Committee has concluded, on balance, that the authority to prohibit
travel by all United States citizens in areas designated by the Secretary of State
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tion as a policy is advisable or not,64 it is clear that statutory limits
should be imposed in pursuing these "cold war" policies as they im-
pinge on the right to travel.
Several bills were introduced in the Eighty-fifth Congress, but no
statute was passed. The Eighty-sixth Congress now has before it some
of the same proposals as well as new ones. There is considerable differ-
ence among them as to the limits of the discretion to be given the Presi-
dent or the Secretary. 65
A two point statute is recommended which would read as follows:
Area restrictions may be imposed on United States citizens
traveling abroad by the President through a directive to the
Secretary of State:
(1) When a state of war exists between this country and the
one to be restricted;
(2) In countries where United States forces are actually engaged
in hostilities.66
There is in such a statute no unbridled discretion "to protect the
nation's best interests" nor power to insure the "orderly conduct of
foreign relations," at the expense of the individual's right to travel, nor
is a necessary instrument to advance the national interest, and it recommends legis-
lation to clear up any doubts as to the possession by the Secretary of State of such
authority. .. ." FREEnOm TO TRAVEL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 52-53, 55.
" The point is made by the authors of the bar committee report that such
restrictions often impose greater penalty on this country than the one against which
it is directed. Id. at 54.
"
5While the 85th Congress failed to enact any legislation in this field, there is
prospect of a statute forthcoming from the 86th Congress. As of this writing the
House has passed H.R. 9069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), which would give the
President wide discretion in restricting areas of the world to entry by United
States citizens. Essentially the bill provides three criteria for area control: first,
where the United States is at war; second, where actual hostilities are in progress;
and third, where the President finds the national interest at stake either because
of inability to provide protection or because the travel would "seriously impair
the foreign relations of the United States." The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has under study at least three different bills, one of which is the Humphrey
Bill (S. 806, 86th Cong., 1st Sss. (1959)) which would restrict the American trav-
eler overseas only when war has been declared or in areas where United States
troops are fighting without a declaration 6f war. Another bill (S. 2287, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959)) introduced by Senator Fulbright adopts the geographical
limitations of H.R. 9069, supra, but adds a provision to prevent travel abroad of any
U.S. citizen who in the opinion of the Secretary would incite international conflicts
involving the United States. Senator Wiley's bill (S. 2315, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.(1959)) also follows the House bill in the area limitations and provides a unique
provision by which the President may make exceptions to any general geographical
restraints for such persons as newsmen, legislators, doctors and missionaries.
Another interesting feature in every bill here discussed except S. 806 is a penalty
section which makes it a misdemeanor punishable by $1,000 fine or one year's
inprisonment to violate travel bans.
. Such a statute is essentially like that introduced by Senator Humphrey.
S. 806, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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any other device by which individual Americans become the unwilling
instruments of foreign policy.
67
KENNETH L. PENEGAR
Corporations-Constitutional Law-Retroactive Application of
Curative Statute Affecting Corporate Existence
The case of Lester Bros. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.' affirmed the
doctrine of Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co. 2 that a corporation
became dormant when the number of stockholders was reduced to less
than the statutory requirement of three. The court in the Lester case
held that the North Carolina legislature's curative act,3 passed in an
attempt to obviate the Park Terrace doctrine, was of no aid to the de-
fendant Pope because the statute could not operate retroactively to defeat
vested rights. In Park Terrace the result of dormancy was that the sole
stockholder became the real party in interest in a breach of contract suit
brought in the name of the corporation.4 In Lester one of two stock-
holders was made a defendant and was held individually liable for an
extension of credit which had ostensibly been made to the corporation
only.
The plaintiff in Lester had sought to hold defendant Pope individu-
ally liable for certain sales of package houses made to defendant corpora-
tion Pope Realty and Insurance Company. The corporation had been
formed with three stockholders. Between January 12 and June 20, 1955,
the plaintiff delivered three bills of merchandise to the Company which
during this time had only two stockholders. These bills were unpaid,
and this indebtedness comprised part of the claim for which suit was,
brought.5  At trial the Superior Court denied plaintiff's motion for
judgment against Pope individually.
On appeal the Supreme Court cited Park Terrace and stated that
when a corporation had less than three stockholders the stockholders
" There is nothing in the proposed statute which would preclude travel to
areas where the individual's safety might be in doubt. It should be government's
function to forewarn the traveler of the dangers and not to prevent him from
assuming the risk.
1250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E.2d 263 (1959).
2243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E2d 584 (1956). For an extensive discussion of this case
see Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1959).
The decision caused much adverse comment. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle
and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956); Latty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. REV. 432, 441-44 (1956); Comment, 14 WAsH. & LEE L. Rrv. 72 (1957).
The plaintiff alleged fraud on the part of Pope and sought to hold him liable
on all other deliveries made to the corporation, as well as these three. The Supreme
Court upheld a finding that there was no reliance on his false statements and there-
fore no liability on the basis of fraud.
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could no longer function as a corporate entity but only as individuals.
Thus Pope was individually liable for the three bills of merchandise, and
the court ruled that plaintiff's motion for judgment should have been
granted.
In 1957, after the Park Terrace decision, G.S. § 55-3.1 was enacted
by the North Carolina legislature for the purpose of nullifying the ruling
that a corporation became dormant when the number of shareholders
dropped below three. In the principal case the court quoted subsection
(d) of this statute which reads:
If any corporation or purported corporation might have been
considered dormant or inactive solely in consequence of the ac-
quisition heretofore of all its, shares by one or two persons, such
corporation or purported corporation is hereby declared to have
bad uninterrupted capacity to act as a corporation.6
The court then stated:
The defendant Pope contends the foregoing statute' relieves
him from individual liability .... [W]hen plaintiff dealt with
Pope the law of this State as declared in the Park Terrace case
made him individually liable .... The plaintiff had a vested right
in that liability. The liability attached in 1955. The Legislature,
in 1957, could not take it away without violating the obligation of
the contract. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10; N.C.
Constitution, Article I, Section 17.8
Thus the plaintiff-creditor acquired a vested right against the stock-
holder Pope individually, even though there was no showing that at the
time the merchandise was delivered the plaintiff was aware that there
were less than three stockholders or that the plaintiff had any intention
of extending credit to anyone other than the corporation itself.
Although the court stated that this vested right could not be abridged
by retroactive legislation, this does not mean that G.S. § 55-3.1 was held
to be wholly void. The court may have intended to hold that only
subsection (d) was unconstitutional, severing this part from the rest
of the statute.9 Or the court may have intended to construe the statute
as constitutional in all cases except where vested rights would be affected,
so that only as applied in the latter case would the act be invalid.10 The
language of the decision is susceptible to either interpretation."1
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1(d) (Supp. 1959).
" It is difficult to tell if the court here referred to all of § 55-3.1 or only sub-
section (d). The dissent seems to support the view that the majority referred only
to subsection (d).
8 250 N.C. at 568, 109 S.E.2d at 266.
' A court may sever part of a statute even when the legislature does not ex-
pressly so provide. El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909).
10 An act may be invalid when applied in certain cases, but this will not cause
the downfall of the entire statute. Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474 (1913).
" The court also quoted with approval from a case which construed a statute
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There are other instances in which the North Carolina court has
interpreted retroactive legislation. A North Carolina statute'12 made
proof of registration in a party's name prima facie evidence of owner-
ship of a vehicle and prima facie evidence that the vehicle was being
operated in the course and scope of the owner's employment. The court
held18 that this statute would apply to causes of action which arose be-
fore its effective date of operation because the statute merely changed a
rule of evidence; the court stated that there is no vested right in a rule
of evidence. Another case14 held constitutional a 1929 statutory amend-
ment 15 as applied retroactively to a trust created in 1927. The court
held that this amendment, allowing revocation of a trust for unborn
beneficiaries, disturbed no vested rights. A subsequent trust case'0 held
valid a retroactive law' 7 which changed the method of removing and
substituting trustees; the court said no substantive rights were involved
and there was no impairment of the obligation Qf contract. The court
has also upheld' s the constitutionality of a statute' 9 which validated a
previous township election and an issue of bonds. Other cases have not
dealt so favorably with retroactive legislative acts. In a dictum the court
has stated20 that a creditor could not be deprived of rights which had
vested under a former statute2 ' imposing double liability on holders of
bank stock, and thus an amendment 22 terminating double liability would
not be allowed to affect such a creditor. Conversely, another dictum
declared 23 that a shareholder could not be assessed under a 1925 statute24
for stock purchased in 1919, since to have held the stockholder liable
would have destroyed the obligation of a contract, impaired vested rights
and denied due process. Where the legislature passed an act25 to vali-
date void deeds of gift by extending the time for registration, the court
as being only operative prospectively. Statutes will be so construed where possible.
However, the language of § 55-3.1 would make it virtually impossible for the court
to hold that the act was not intended to be retroactive.
"N.C. GE. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).
"Spencer v. McDowell Motor Co., 236 N.C. 239, 72 S.E.2d 598 (1952). The
statute excepted pending litigation from its effect.
" Stanback v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 197 N.C. 292, 148 S.E. 313 (1929).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1950).
16 Bateman v. Sterrett, 201 N.C. 59, 159 S.E. 14 (1931).
'* N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, ch. 78 (now G.S. §§ 45-10, -12, -17 (1950)).
"Burney v. Commissioners of Bladen County, 184 N.C. 274, 114 S.E. 298
(1922).
"9 N.C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1921, ch. 32.
."o Hood ex el. United Bank & Trust Co. v. Richardson Realty, Inc., 211 N.C.
582, 590, 191 S.E. 410, 415 (1937) (dictum).
21 N.C. Pub. Laws 1921, ch. 4, § 21 ; N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 121, § 1.
" N.C. Pub. Laws 1935, ch. 99.
" Bank of Pinehurst v. Derby, 218 N.C. 653, 657-58, 12 S.E.2d 260, 263(1940) (dictum). The court avoided the constitutional question by construing the
statute as operative only prospectively.
"N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 117.
"N.C. Pub. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, ch. 20.
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said, in refusing relief under the statute, that "the validating statute, if
constitutional, cannot be invoked to impair the vested right. 26  The
court has also stated2 7 that a statute2 s would not be construed as giving
authority to retroactive provisions of a corporate charter amendment
where such a construction would interfere with vested rights in pre-
ferred stock dividends.
The construction of curative legislation affecting corporations has
been dealt with by other jurisdictions. An Iowa case held consti-
tutional a curative act3" which validated a corporation previously de-
fective due to improper publication. The court here stated that the
statute interfered with no contractual libality. The Tennessee court3 '
sustained a statute32 which validated corporate charters previously de-
fective due to faulty acknowledgment. In this case the court held that
there were no vested rights in a defective charter. The United States
Supreme Court, however, held33 that the California legislature could
not take away the individual liability of a director of a corporation, the
liability having vested under a former constitutional provision.3 4 The
repeal of this constitutional provision did not help the defendant because
the obligation was contractual, and the right to enforce it had already
vested in the plaintiff. An Oregon case35 construed as operating
prospectively a constitutional amendment"6 which imposed double li-
ability on holders of bank stock; this construction kept the amendment
from being unconstitutional.
The North Carolina curative statute, G.S. § 55-3.1, took effect on
July 1, 1957. It is clear under the statutory construction in the prin-
cipal case that this act could sustain all corporations formed on or after
the effective date of the statute. Under this decision, however, the statute
will be able to sustain corporations in existence before this date only
in so far as no vested rights are involved in the corporate transactions.
This has left many problems for the one- and two-man corporations re-
garding transactions during the time before July 1, 1957. Would the
grantee in a deed executed by the dormant corporation be liable on
a dower claim if the sole shareholder, or either of the two shareholders,
2" Booth v. Hairston, 193 N.C. 278, 283, 136 S.E. 879, 881 (1927).
" Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
. N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 2, §§ 29, 30, 37, as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1925,
ch. 118, §§ 1, 2(a), as amended; N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, ch. 2, § 19, as amended;
N.C. Pub. Laws 1925, ch. 118, §§ 2, 2a, as amended.
Adler v. Baker-Dodge Theatre Co., 190 Iowa 970, 181 N.W. 254 (1921).
20 Iowa Acts and Joint Resolutions 1915, ch. 127.
Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 28 S.W. 668 (1894).
"
2Tenn. Acts 1890, ch. 17.
'
8 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
'CAL. CoNs'r. art. XII, § 3 (1879).
02 Schramm v. Done, 135 Ore. 16, 293 Pac. 931 (1930).
20 ORE. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1912).
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died before this date ?m Would there be personal income tax problems
raised for the one or two shareholders ?s In all corporate litigation
where the cause of action arose before July 1, 1957, would the one or
two stockholders be the real party or parties in interest ?39 Did the
corporate status come and go before July 1, 1957, depending on whether
at any given time there were at least three shareholders or less than that
number?4° Unfortunately the answers to these and other questions will
have to be determined on a case by case basis.
JoHN G. SHAW
Criminal Law-Inciting To Riot
In State v. Cole- the Ku Klux Klan burned two crosses in the county
and publicized a meeting to be held later in the week, the purpose of
which was to intimidate the Indian population of the county. Before
the day of the meeting the sheriff was apprised of tension growing among
the Indians of the county. He went to defendant Cole, who claimed to
be the Grand Wizard of the Klan, and told him that it would be danger-
ous to hold the meeting, but the meeting was not cancelled. As mem-
bers of the Klan began appearing with firearms at the appointed place
for the meeting, Indians of the county appeared with firearms and shoot-
ing began. Several hundred shots were fired before law enforcement
officers coiad restore order. There was no further attempt to convene
the meeting. The defendants Cole and Martin (and others to the
State unknown) were indicted for inciting to riot, in that they willfully
and unlawfully, while armed with firearms, assembled with the intent
to preach racial dissension and coerce and intimidate the populace, and
with the common intent to carry out such purpose in a violent manner
to the terror of the people and to assist each other against all who should
oppose them. The defendants were convicted, and the Supreme Court
upheld defendant Cole's conviction of inciting to riot (defendant
Martin's conviction was reversed on other grounds). In so doing the
court recognized that inciting to riot and riot are separate and distinct
offenses and said:
[I]nciting to riot is a common law offense, the gist of which is
its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace, though the parties
" This question was raised in Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 48, 50 (1957).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- ot
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 471, 479 (1956).
" This question was raised by Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or
Two-Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 471, 479 (1956).
o This question was raised in 250 N.C. at 570, 109 S.E.2d at 267 (dissent).
Judge Bobbitt also dissented in the Park Terrace case on its original hearing. If
his point of view had been adopted, several problems in North Carolina corpora-
tion law might have been avoided.
1249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
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first assembled for an innocent purpose .... "Inciting to riot. ..
means such a course of conduct, by the use of words, signs or
language, or any other means by which one can be urged to action,
as would naturally lead or urge other men to engage in or enter
upon conduct which, if completed, would make a riot.' 2
The court also stated that the defendants could not have been convicted
of inciting to riot unless the incitement resulted in a riot.
A survey of the cases pertaining to the crime of inciting to riot, ex-
clusive of the principal case, discloses that there are seemingly only two
jurisdictions that have dealt directly with the crime of inciting to riot,
Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. Apparently the earliest
case of record in the United States recognizing inciting to riot to 'be an
indictable offense was decided in 1824.4
The American cases make it clear that riot and inciting to riot are
separate and distinct offenses.5 In cases where no riot has occurred, but
where the defendant's acts or words were such as to imply that they
were committed or said with the intent to provoke a riot or with willful
disregard of their probable consequences, convictions of inciting to riot
have been upheld.6 In an early case one court, in discussing the problem,
said that an averment that a riot resulted is not necessary to a convic-
tion of inciting to riot.7 In most of the cases the defendant has been
indicted for inciting to riot and riot.8 Where a riot was found to have
1Id. at 741, 107 S.E.2d at 738, quoting Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super.
318, 321, 82 A2d 695, 697 (1951).
'Riot is defined as a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more
persons assembling together of their own authority with an intent mutually to assist
one another against all who shall oppose them, and afterwards putting the design
into execution in a terrific and violent manner, whether the object in question be
lawful gr otherwise. State v. Hoffman, 199 N.C. 328, 154 S.E. 314 (1930) ; State
v. Stalcup, 23 N.C. 30 (1840).
'Commonwealth v. Haines, 4 Clark (Pa.) 17 (1824).
r State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 Atl. 515 (1939); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122
Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936); Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super.
482 (1917).
o Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951) ; Common-
wealth v. Frankfeld, 114 Pa. Super. 262, 173 Atl. 834 (1934) ; Commonwealth v.
Egan, 113 Pa. Super. 375, 173 AtI. 764 (1934).
In England inciting to riot seems to be a properly indictable offense when no
riot-or even assembly-occurred. No reported cases were found but there is a
"preceden' (apparently based on an unreported case) on inciting to riot, where
the first count of the indictment alleged that as a result of the incitement there was
an assembly, and the second count alleged the inciting and omitted the assembling
in consequence of it 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 381 (9th ed. 1877) ; see CROWN CIRCUIT
ASSISTANT 167 (1788) ; CROWN CIRcuIr COMPANION 420 (1st Amer. ed. 1816) ; 2
CHrrry, CRImINAL LAW § 506 (1841); 3 Bisnop, NEW CRImINAL PRoCEDURR §
999(4) (1913).
'United States v. Fenwick, 25 Fed. Cas. 1062 (No. 15086) (D.C. Cir. 1836).
8 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938) ; Com-
monwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Ati. 177 (1936) ; Commonwealth v.
Egan, 113 Pa. Super. 375, 173 Atl. 764 (1934) ; Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa.
Super. 482 (1917); United States v. Fenwick, 25 Fed. Cas. 1062 (No. 15086)
(D.C. Cir. 1836).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
occurred, the court in one case upheld a conviction without stating
whether this was done on one or both counts, 9 while two cases indicated
that the conviction could be upheld on either or both counts.10 However,
it has also been said that the lesser crime of inciting to riot may become
merged in the more serious crime of riot,' and apparently one conviction
has been affirmed on that basis.'2
Although basically in accord with the American cases, the English
cases have gone to the extent of holding that one who incites, encourages,
promotes, or abets a riot may be held as a principal rioter,18 even though
he takes no active part in the riot or is not present when it occurs.14
The only American case found that has considered this latter point mere-
ly recognized that the common law permitted this to be done.'5
While there is accord between the American and English cases on
the proposition that even though no riot ensues the defendant's conduct
may nevertheless be the basis for a conviction of inciting to riot,", this
may not be the law in North Carolina, as indicated by dictum to the
contrary in the Cole case. It is submitted that if North Carolina con-
tinues to require that the riot be proved, the indictment should contain
charges for inciting to riot and riot, and the conviction should be for riot,
or possibly, as warranted by some of the Pennsylvania cases,' 7 for in-
citing to riot and riot.
THOMAs L. Noxus, JR.
'United States v. Fenwick, supra note 8.
0 "Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938); Com-
monwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936).11 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, supra note 10; Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa.
Super. 482 (1917). The application of "merger" may be questioned if the strict
common law definition of merger is adhered to: "The common law rule was that,
if the offenses were of different degrees, there was a merger, but not if they
were of the same degree. Misdemeanors merged in felonies ... and conspiracy to
commit a felony in the felony, if committed. But there was no merger of a felony
in a felony ... Nor was there any merger of a misdemeanor in a misdemeanor,
as of an attempt or conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor in the misdemeanor when
committed." Cx.&iuc & MARSHALL, CRIMEs, 103 (6th ed. 1958). See also Graff v.
People, 208 Ill. 312, 70 N.E. 299 (1904).
12 Commonwealth v. Merrick, supra note 11.13Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C.C. 288, 12 L.T.O.S. 537 (1848); Clifford v.
Brandon, 2 Camp. 358, 170 Eng. Rep. 1183 (Com. Pl. 1809); Rex v. Royce, 4
Burr. 2073, 98 Eng. Rep. 81 (K.B. 1767) ; Anonymous, 12 Mod. Rep. 509, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1482 (K.B. 1702). Compare: "In misdemeanors there are no degrees, but all
who participate in them are principals and may be charged as such and convicted
upon proof of having taken any part therein." Commonwealth v. Jaffas, 284 Mass.
417, 419, 188 N.E. 263, 264 (1933).
:' "It is not the hand that strikes the blow, or throws the stone that is alone
guilty under the circumstances; but that he who inflames people's minds and in-
duces them, by violent means, to accomplish an illegal object, is himself a rioter,
though he takes no part in the riot.' Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C.C. 288 (1848).
" Commonwealth v. Merrick, 65 Pa. Super. 482 (1917).
" This is also in accord with the English law relating to inciting to other crimes.
Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801); see generally, 14
ENGLSH & EmPIrE DIGEST, Part I, § 6(7) (1956).
17 Commonwealth v. Apriceno, 131 Pa. Super. 158, 198 At. 515 (1938) ; Com-
monwealth v. Sais, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 186 Atl. 177 (1936).
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Criminal Law-Search Warrants-Requirements of Search Warrants
for Liquor Possessed for the Purpose of Sale
Although the recent case of State v,. Banks' had a modern fact situa-
tion,2 it brought to the attention of the North Carolina Supreme Court
the old and troublesome problem of the requirements of search warrants
obtained for liquor possessed for the purpose of sale.3
Search warrants may be issued in North Carolina only as authorized
by statute.4  The statute authorizing search warrants for liquor pos-
sessed for the purpose of sale and for liquor-maldng materials is G.S.
§ 18-13. The pertinent provisions are:
Upon the filing of a complaint under oath by a reputable citizen,
or information furnished under oath by an officer charged with
the execution of the law, before . . . [any] officer authorized by
the law to issue warrants, that he has reason to believe that any
person has in his possession, at a place or places specified, liquor
for the purpose of sale, or equipment or materials designed ...
for use in the manufacture of... liquor, a warrant shall be issued
commanding the officer ... to search the place or places described
in such complaint or information ....
There is no other statute specifically dealing with the requirements
of search warrants for liquor, but G.S. § 15-27 places certain restrictions
on the issuance of all search warrants. It provides that:
Any officer who shall sign and issue ... a search warrant with-
out first requiring the complainant or other person to sign an
affidavit under oath and examining said person . . . in regard
thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered
by reason of the issuance of such illegal search warrant shall be
competent as evidence in the trial of any action: Provided, no
facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search war-
rant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring
* . . a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial
of any action.
Before the 1957 General Assembly enacted G.S. § 15-27.1, the North
Carolina decisions were in conflict as to whether or not a liquor warrant
issued under G.S. § 18-13 had to meet the requirements of G.S. § 15-27.
G.S. § 15-27.1 was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that:
1250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
'The search warrant was obtained with information transmitted by highway
patrol radio.
' The scope of this note will be limited to the procedure to be followed in issuing
a search warrant, and will not discuss the requirement of a description of the place
to be searched and of the items to be searched for. These latter requirements are
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-26 (1953). As to the detail needed to comply
with the statute, see MACHEN, SEARcH AND SzrzuRE 21-28 (1950).
'State v. Mann, 27 N.C. 45 (1844) ; State v. McDonald, 14 N.C. 468 (1832).
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"The provision of this article5 shall apply to search warrants issued
for any purpose including those issued pursuant to the provisions of G.S.
18-13 ...."
The fact that North Carolina needed such legislation becomes ap-
parent when one examines the case law dealing with the procedure for
issuing search warrants for liquor prior to the enactment of this statute.
It appears that the court initially presumed that search warrants for
liquor had to comply with the dual requirements of G.S. § 18-13 and
G.S. § 15-27.6 However, in 1952 in State v. McLamb7 the court held
that only the provisions of G.S. § 18-13 were applicable to search war-
rants for liquor. In that case the court held not relevant the defendant's
contention that the search warrant was defective for the reason that the
magistrate who issued it had not complied with the requisites of G.S.
§ 15-27 in that he had failed to require the procuring officer to furnish
facts showing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. Thus
apparently under that decision, if the search warrant for liquor was
sought by "an officer charged with the execution of the law," the normal
G.S. § 15-27 requirement of furnishing facts upon which the officer
based his belief to the examining magistrate was relaxed. State v.
Brady,8 a later case, reiterated this rule. Thus there arose a distinction
between the basic requirements for the issuance of search warrants for
liquor and the issuance of search warrants for other types of contraband.
The constitutionality of G.S. § 18-13 has never been challenged.
However, since under the McLamb and Brady decisions its provisions
do not require that an officer seeking a search warrant for liquor fur-
nish facts showing probable cause for its issuance, this statute would
appear to be vulnerable to such an attack. The North Carolina Constitu-
tion requires that all warrants "be supported by evidence," 9 and the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that a state shall issue no warrant without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation. 10 G.S. § 18-13 as interpreted by McLamb and
Brady would not seem to meet the foregoing requirements.
'Article 4, chapter 15, entitled Search Warrants, of which G.S. § 15-27 is a
component part.
' Several pre-1952 decisions deal with the issuance of search warrants for
liquor possessed for the purpose of sale, and discuss compliance with G.S. § 15-27.
E.g., State v. Gross, 230 N.C. 734, 55 S.E.2d 517 (1949) ; State v. Elder, 217 N.C.
111, 6 S.E.2d 840 (1940) ; State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195 S.E. 392 (1938).
7235 N.C. 251, 69 S.E.2d 537 (1952).
8 238 N.C. 404, 78 S.E.2d 126 (1953).
'N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 15.
"o "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27(1949).
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Although the court emphatically stated in the McLamb and Brady
decisions that G.S. § 18-13 was controlling as to the procedural requisites
in cases of liquor warrants, in reality the court maintained this position
for only a short time. Soon after the McLamb decision the court
rendered several decisions that indicated that both G.S. § 18-13 and G.S.
§ 15-27 applied with equal force to the issuance of liquor warrants. In
State v. Rainey" the court, ruling on the validity of a liquor warrant,
stated, "The [issuing] procedure followed fulfills the requirements of the
controlling statutes. G.S. 18-13 and G.S. 15-27 as amended."' 2  In
State v. Harrison13 the court relied on G.S. § 15-27 to exclude evidence
obtained under an invalid search warrant for liquor issued under G.S.
§ 18-13. In State v. McMilliam'4 the court again relied on the pro-
visions of G.S. § 15-27 to exclude evidence obtained where officers made
a search for liquor without a warrant under circumstances that required
a valid search warrant.
In 1956 the court in State v. White 5 held that a search warrant for
liquor was defective because the issuing officer had not required the
constable to sign an affidavit under oath to support the issuance of the
warrant as required by G.S. § 15-27. Thus this case was in direct con-
flict with the court's previous holding in the McLamb and Brady de-
cisions. 6
The 1957 General Assembly took cognizance of the conflict among
the cases in this area and enacted the aforementioned G.S. § 15-27.1.
The obvious intent of the General Assembly was to insure that before
any magistrate issued a search warrant for liquor he would examine
the complainant, take a sworn affidavit, and make a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause upon evidence furnished by the complainant. The
General Assembly thereby overruled the McLamb and Brady decisions
on this precise point.
In the principal case, State v. Banks,17 a highway patrolman saw
the defendant make eight or nine trips into an Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol store and on each trip return to an automobile with a large paper
bag. The patrolman stopped the defendant, asked for permission to
search the automobile, and, when this request was refused, radioed head-
quarters and informed a second patrolman. Acting on this information,
the second patrolman went before an issuing officer and obtained a search
warrant. The automobile, stopped a second time by the patrolman, was
12236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E2d 39 (1953).
' Id. at 740, 74 S.E.2d at 40.
', 239 N.C. 659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954).1"243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E.2d 202 (1956).
15244 N.C. 73, 92 S.E.2d 404 (1956).
" For an analysis of the conflict between the McLamb and White 'decisions see
NoTF, 35 N.C.L. R-v. 424 (1957).17250 N.C. 728. 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
1960]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
searched pursuant to the warrant, and a large quantity of tax-paid liquor
was found.
The defendant was convicted for the illegal possession of the liquor
that had been seized in his automobile, and on appeal the validity of the
search warrant was challenged. In a per curiam opinion the North
Carolina Supreme Court said that "the information furnished by Patrol-
man McDonald over the radio to Patrolman Moran, who signed the
affidavit based on such information, pursuant to which the search -war-
riht was issued, was sufficient infornwtion within the meaning of G.S.
18-13 to authorize Patrolman Moran to make the affidavit and to
authorize the Clerk of the General County Court... to issue such war-
rant. State v. McLamb .... "218
The court's acquiescence in the use of the information transmitted
over the patrol radio is in essence the approval of the use of hearsay
evidence in obtaining a search warrant. This rule of evidence is estab-
lished in North Carolina as in many jurisdictions,"0 and within the
bbunds of proper discretion2" it would seem to be a sound and practical
one. In light of North Carolina's adoption of the use of hearsay evidence
to show probable cause, the magistrate was justified in issuing the search
warrant in the Banks case.
Even if under the circumstances of the case the requirements of
G.S. § 15-27 were not met,21 the defendant failed to overcome the pre-
18Id. at 730, 110 S.E.2d at 323.
" Some courts have held affidavits sufficient where the affiant's belief is based
oh information received from "reliable persons," "responsible persons," "reputable
persons," "citizens," and "credible people." Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950).
The federal rule is contra. "A search warrant may issue only upon evidence
which would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury ... and would
lead a man of prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been com-
mitted." Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932).
The North Carolina decisions seem to approve the hearsay rule, and there is no
indication of an adoption of the federal rule. State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195
S.E. 392 (1938). "There is nothing in the statute [G.S. § 15-27] that requires the
complainant or other person who makes the affidavit to state therein who his
informant is, or which requires the informant to make the affidavit, as seems to
be the contention of the appellant?' Id. at 218, 195 S.E. at 392; accord, State
v. Elder. 217 N.C. 111, 6 S.E.2d 840 :(1940). These cases hold only that the in-
former's name need not be given in the affidavit. Whether the magistrate would
be justified in issuing the warrant without learning the source on the examination
is an open question.
20A magistrate cannot be allowed to find a probability of guilt without ex-
amiing the complaining witness in regards to his affidavit. G.S. § 15-27. This
exaiination is to test the reliability' 6f the evidence, and if the magistrate fails
to make such an examination recourse may be had against him. G.S. § 15-27.
Reliable evidence has been held to include hearsay informatiori originating with
reputable informers. State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195 S.E. 392 (1938); Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950). It would not apptar that anonymous phone calls or tips
should be accepted as reliable hearsay. MACHEN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE fl '(1950).
21 From the statement of facts given in the Banks' case it appears that Patrol-
man Moran 'told the issuing 0fficei9 ju.t' what Patrolman McDonald had seen
and that Patrolman Moran did sign the afidavit, so the requirements of"G.S. §
15-27 would seem to have been complied with.
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sumption of statutory compliance that arises when the warrant and
supporting affidavit are set out in the record.22  The decision is there-
fore proper. However, the court in citing the McLamb decision and
speaking of meeting the requirements of only G.S. § 18-13 could leave
the erroneous impression that there is still a distinction between the re-
quirements for obtaining a search warrant for illegally possessed liquor
and a search warrant for other statutory contraband. As we have
noted, since the enactment of G.S. § 15-27.1, there is no longer any such
distinction in the requirements for issuance of search warrants. It is
unfortunate that the court did not seize upon this opportunity to take
judicial notice of G.S. § 15-27.1, and it is hoped that on the court's
next opportunity it will recognize this legislative move toward greater
uniformity and thereby clear the muddy waters in this area.
JoiaN H. KERR, III
Criminal Procedure-Capital Offenses-Prosecution's Mention of
Death Penalty Before Jury as Error
Prior to 1949 a conviction of murder in the first degree in North
Carolina carried an automatic death penalty under the former version
of G.S. § 14-17.1 That year the General Assembly added a proviso
to the statute which stated that "if at the time of rendering its verdict in
open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be im-
prisonment for life ... and the court shall so instruct the jury.' 2
State v. Mclfillan3 was apparently the first case interpreting this
proviso. The trial judge had instructed the jury that they might recom-
mend life imprisonment if they felt justified in doing so under the facts
and circumstances of the case. A new trial was granted because the
2 State v. Rhodes, 233 N.C. 453, 64 S.E.2d 287 (1951) ; State v. Elder, 217 N.C.
111, 6 S.E.2d 840 (1940); cf. State v. McMilliam, 243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E.2d 202
(1956), where the State failed to produce a search warrant or render testimony
supporting its existence. The court ruled that the evidence obtained by the search
would not be introduced. "It might have been a general warrant, which is
'dangerous to liberty'." Id. at 773, 92 S.E.2d at 204.
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, im-
prisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or ,Which' shall. be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree and- shall be punished with death. All other kinds
of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree .... "N.C. Sess. Laws
1893, chs. 85, 281.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). For the origin of the proviso see Report of
the Committee for Improvement of Justice, Popular Government, Jan. 1949, p. 13,
col. 3; Criminal Law, Survey of Statutory Changes, 27 N.C.L. Rxv. 449 (1950).
Provisos of like effect were'also added to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1953) (burglary) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953)(arson).
2233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E.2d 212 (1951).
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charge implied restrictions upon the jury's discretion unauthorized
by the statute. The court held that the proviso gave the jury an "un-
bridled discretionary right" 4 to recommend life imprisonment upon
finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder; that the right had
no conditions, qualifications or limitations imposed upon it; and that any
charge, instruction or suggestion by the court as to causes for which the
right should or should not be exercised was reversible error. Subse-
quent cases were in accord."
In State v. Dockery6 counsel for the private prosecution argued to
the jury: "There is no such thing as life imprisonment in North Caro-
lina today.' 7 Counsel explained that he had reference to the state's
liberal parole laws. This was held to be "an appeal calculated and
intended to induce members of the jury not to exercise the unbridled
discretionary right, given to them by law." s The court also stated that
such argument was improper in that it went outside the record. The
case left open the question what would be permissible argument ad-
dressed to the jury's discretion. The court seemed to imply that the
prosectuor in a capital case could not argue that the evidence did not
warrant a recommendation of life imprisonment.0
State v. Oakes'° and State v. Pughn seem to strengthen any implica-
tion of the Dockery case that a solicitor may not argue for the death
penalty. In both cases convictions were reversed because the trial
judge repeated to the jury the contention of the solicitor that they
should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without
a recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life. In
Oakes the judge quoted only the ultimate contention of the State.
However, in Pugh the judge went further and repeated the reasons the
State had given for withholding the recommendation. The charges of
both trial judges were held to be erroneous because they infringed on
the unbridled discretion of the jury as guaranteed by the proviso of
G.S. § 14-17.
One justice concurred in Pugh,12 pointing out that it was his im-
pression that a majority of the court felt that a solicitor had no right
I Id. at 633, 65 S.E.2d at 213.5 State v. Denny, 249 N.C. 114, 105 S.E.2d 446 (1958); State v. Cook, 245
N.C. 610, 96 S.E.2d 842 (1957); State v. Adams, 243 N.C. 290, 90 S.E.2d 383(1955) ; State v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 89 S.E.2d 789 (1955) ; State v. Connor, 241
N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d 584 (1954); State v. Simmons, 236 N.C. 340, 72 S.E2d 743(1952) ; State v. Simmons, 234 N.C. 290, 66 S.E.2d 897 (1951) ; State v. Marsh, 234
N.C. 101, 66 S.E.2d 684 (1951).
238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953).
'Id. at 226, 77 S.E.2d at 667.8 Id. at 227, 77 S.E.2d at 668.
'Ibid. See also Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court-
Crimnal Procedure, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 438 (1954).
20249 N.C. 282, 106 S.E.2d 206 (1958).
1 250 N.C. 278, 108 S.E.2d 649 (1959).
"Id. at 280, 108 S.E.2d at 651.
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to urge a jury to refuse to exercise their power to recommend life im-
prisonment in a capital case. This was the first opinion that said directly
what Dockery, Oakes and the majority opinion of Pugh seemed to say
indirectly, i.e., that the question of punishment could not be argued by
the State to the jury.
Two justices joined in a dissent in the Pugh case' 3 stating that the
jury should be allowed to hear proper argument based on the evidence
and a charge of the court fairly reviewing the contentions upon the
evidence and then should be allowed to exercise their discretion. They
pointed out that if, as the majority held, it was error for the judge to
review contentions of the State in regard to punishment, it would
follow that it would also be error for such contentions to be made by
the solicitor. They admitted that the jury had discretion, but con-
tended that the manner of its exercise should be governed by the evi-
dence,1 4 not mere whim or fancy. The dissent further stated that State
v. McMillan was erroneous and that the error should not be perpetuated,
thus seeming to assume that the majority holding was a necessary result
of the holding in McMillan.
State v. Manning'5 is the most recent development in the interpreta-
tion of G.S. §14-17. On voir dire examination the solicitor said: "As
far as the state is concerned the sole and only purpose of this trial is to
send the defendant . . . to his death in the gas chamber .... -16 The
prospective juror to whom the statement was made was discharged upon
defendant's motion. However, three other prospective jurors who had
heard the statement were seated on the jury after the judge instructed
them to "disabuse their minds" 17 of the remark. Defendant's motion
to discharge the whole panel was overruled by the trial court. There-
after the solicitor informed five prospective jurors that the state was
asking for the death penalty. Defendant's objections to these state-
ments were overruled. Upon the jury's returning a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree without a recommendation of life imprison-
ment, defendant appealed.
13 250 N.C. at 286, 108 S.E.2d at 655.
" In State v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. 299, 302, 59 S.E.2d 826, 827 (1950) the
court said that the proviso in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape) gave the
jury "the right on the evidence in the case to render a verdict of rape with
recommendation of life imprisonment." When placed in context, this statement
seems to lend little support to the view of the Pugh dissent. The court used the
quoted language in affirming the exclusion of evidence that defendant contended
had become relevant, because of the proviso, as bearing on punishment. Apparently
there have been no rape, arson, or burglary cases that turned on the point of jury
discretion.1251 N.C. 1, 110 S.E.2d 474 (1959).
"'Id. at 2, 110 S.E.2d at 475.
17 Ibid.
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The, controlling opinion in Manning' held that the trial court had
committed three reversible errors. First, the trial judge erred in failing
to sustain, the defendant's motion to dismiss the panel of jurors. The
statement by the solicitor that the only reason for the trial was to send
defendant to the gas chamber was held to violate the proviso in G.S.
§ 14-17 and to be so prejudicial to the defendant that merely telling the
panel to dismiss the remark from their minds could not remove the
prejudice. Second, the trial judge erred when he failed to sustain an
objection to the solicitor's statements to the five prospective jurors
that the State was asking for the death penalty. It was held, without
explanation, that to allow the statements would be "a manifest violation
of the proviso in G.S. § 14-17."'" The only authority cited was State
v. Carter2 0 which had held that a defendant indicted for drunken driving
%vas entitleA to an impartial judge and jury and a fair trial in an "atmos-
pher of judicialcalm." 2.' Third, the controlling opinion held that it was
error to refuse a manslaughter charge on the evidence in the case.
The concurring opinion in Manning22 stated that the remark that
the only purpose of ife trial was to send defendant to the gas chamber
was error because it implied erroneously that defendant had tendered
a plea of "guilty '(which, 'if accepted, would call for life imprisonment
uider G.S. § f 5-162. f) an1 that it'had'been refused by the court. While
the "oiniion" 'made no mention' of whether the statement violated the
pri6sb in G.S..§ "14-17, it agreed" with the controlling opinion that the
staterrient wxas 'such thkt an instruction by the judge could not cure its
prejudicial ,effet. *The concurring justices also agreed with the con-
frolling opinion 'that failure to give the requested manslaughter charge
wa's reversible error.
. The remainder of the concurring opinion was devoted, in effect, to
dissenting from the view of the controlling justices that it was error for
the solicitor to be allowed to tell prospective jurors that the State was
seeking the deathpenaly. .The concurring justices indicated in positive
languagethat in their opinion it would be permissible for a solicitor to
make such statements. They also pointed out that they thought "it
permissible for the court to state the ultimate contentions of the State
and of 'the defendant, namely, the, simple statement that the State
contends', the 'jury should not, and the defendant contends the jury
should, recommend life iimprisonment, but that it is not permissible for
1" In Manning there was no opinion in which a majority of the justices joined.
Three justices joined in the leading opinion, two concurred on grounds other than
the one here under discussion, one dissented, and one did not sit. Therefore, the
wvriter has used the term "cohitrolling opinion" in lieu of "majority opinion."
119 251 N.C. at 5, 110 S.E.2d at 477.
20233 N.C. 581, 65 S.E.2d 9 (1951).2 11 Id. at 583, 65 S.E.2d at 10.
22251 N.C. at 6, 110 S.E.2d at 477.
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the court to discuss or review the various reasons or arguments sub-
mitted by the State's counsel or by the defendant's counsel in support
of their respective ultimate contentions." 23 The concurring opinion
thereby expressly disapproved the result reached in Oakes, although
it did not go so far as to disapprove that reached in Pugh. Furthermore,
the opinion stated that while the jury's discretion is absolute or un-
bridled in the sense that there is no rule of law by which the jury is to
be guided in making its decision, "it does not follow that the State's
counsel and the defense counsel may not submit their respective con-
tentions for jury consideration.1 24
The Manning dissent 23 did not consider the initial statement made
by the solicitor nor did it mention the judge's refusal to give a man-
slaughter charge. As to the statements of the solicitor upon voir dire,
that the State was asking for the death penalty it expressed substantially
the same view as the concurring opinion, stressing that the proviso of
G.S. § 14-17 does not warrant the holding that a solicitor could not so
argue.20  The dissent also indicated that the proviso would not prohibit
argument for the death penalty. The dissenting justice warns that the
"erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the proviso in G.S. 14-17"-'
in the principal case and in Oakes and Pugh has the effect of abolishing
capital punishment to a large extent, if not completely, in North Carolina.
Conceding that the correct interpretation of the proviso in G.S.
§ 14-17 is that it gives the jury "unbridled discretion" in recommending
the life sentence, it does not seem to follow that urging the death penalty
places a "bridle" on the jury's discretion. If permitted, a solicitor could
make a very convincing argument in favor of the death penalty, but
the jury would not be bound thereby to bring in a verdict of guilty with
no recommendation. If the court were to tell the jury that it must
consider certain factors as conclusive in deciding whether to make the
recommendation or not, it would seem that then and only then would
their discretion be restricted in a legal sense. Even in the latter instance
the jury would not be bound to bring in a verdict without recommenda-
tion, because the death penalty can never be mandatory in North Caro-
28Id. at 7, 110 S.E.2d at 478.
2, Ibid.
" Id. at 8, 110 S.E.2d at 478.
" The reader will recall that the dissent in Pugh stated that an erroneous de-
cision in McMillan was responsible for the result reached by the majority in Pugh.
Text accompanying note 14 supra. In Manning, however, the dissenter (whojoined in the Pugh dissent) seems to have reasoned that McMillan does not require
the result reached by the controlling opinion. Quaere whether the inconsistency
reflects an acquiescence in McMillan on its facts by the dissenter since his dissent
in Pugqh.27251 N.C. at 10, 110 S.E.2d at 480.
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lina except when the jury in its discretion fails to recommend life im-
prisonment.
An argument can be made to the effect that since capital punishment
is still sanctioned in this state, it would seem to follow that the State
is entitled to a jury that would have no objecfion to capital punishment
under certain circumstances. If this be true, then it would seem to
follow that a solicitor should be allowed to examine prospective jurors in
order to determine whether or not they have any conscientious objec-
tions to inflicting capital punishment, in order to insure that the State
obtains such a jury. To the extent that Manning implies that the
State is not entitled to so question prospective jurors, it is submitted
that the case is inconsistent with North Carolina's provision for capital
punishment. Carrying this argument to its logical conclusion one
reasons that if the solicitor is permitted to so question prospective jurors,
he is'at the same time clearly implying that the State desires the jurors
to bring back a verdict requiring that the defendant be punished by
d~th. If it would be permissible for the solicitor to imply that the State
disires that the accused be so punished, it would seem anomalous to
disallow a direct statement to that effect.
Until 1949 the right of the prosecution to make inquiry on voir dire
as to a prospective juror's views on capital punishment was well estab-
lished by North Carolina case law.28  No case since the proviso was
added to G.S. § 14-17 has held or intimated that the challenge because
of objection to capital punishment is no longer available to the State,
unless it'be Manning. As late as 1954 the court gave tacit approval to
the use of the challenge.29 The overwhelming weight of authority in
this country holds that it is proper to ask a prospective juror if he would
have any conscientious scruples against capital punishment.8 0
The argument of the concurring and dissenting opinions of the
Manning case seems to be bolstered by the failure of the controlling
opinion to explain how words spoken by counsel can restrict jury dis-
cretion. Although authority from other jurisdictions with statutes sim-
ilar to G.S. § 14-17 has not been cited by the court, the weight of
2 See State v. Vick, 132 N.C. 995, 43 S.E. 626 (1903) ; State v. Bowman, 80
N.C. 432 (1879).2 State v. Canipe, 240 N.C. 60, 81 S.E.2d 173 (1954).
'0 See Johnson v. State, 203 Ala. 30, 81 So. 820 (1919) ; Bell v. State, 102 Ark.
530, 180 S.W. 186 (1915) ; People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P.2d 794 (1940) ;
Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 135 S.E. 186 (1926) ; People v. Winchester, 352 I1.
237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933) ; Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 11 N.E. 360 (1886) ;
Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1945) ; Spain v. State, 59 Miss. 19(1881); State v. Comery, 78 N.H. 6, 95 Atl. 670 (1915); Commonwealth v.
Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 2 A.2d 736 (1938) ; State v. Condit, 101 Utah 558, 125 P.2d
801 (1942) ; State v. Aragon, 41 Wyo. 308, 285 Pac. 803 (1930).
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authorityal allows the State to seek and argue for the death penalty,
sometimes even in a seemingly unfair manner.32
From the standpoint of pure justice, the result produced by the
controlling opinion in Manning may be justified under the present
method of handling capital cases. Under G.S. § 14-17 guilt and punish-
ment are determined in the same verdict. There is the possibility that
if the State seeks to enforce the law in its most extreme form, argument
that would not prejudice the defendant on the question of punishment
could be given too much weight in the determination of the initial ques-
tion of guilt.
Another possibility of prejudice to defendant on the issue of guilt
arises because the State's argument against the jury's recommending life
imprisonment would seem to force defendant to argue in the alternative
that he is not guilty, but that if he is found guilty the jury should recom-
mend life imprisonment. This objection is subject to the attack that in
many cases a party may be required to offer alternative arguments.
It might be pointed out, however, that in those cases the party's life
is not at stake. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the
gravity of death cases requires that they receive special treatment 'OL
review.3 3 It would seem that if capital defendants are entitled to special
considerations on appeal they also ought to be relieved of the task
of arguing these alternatives in the lower court.
In the opinion of the writer the statute cannot properly be interpreted
to deny argument by the State for the death penalty. Conceding that
such argument is permissible, the problem then is that the argument
concerning punishment may be prejudicial on the issue of guilt. A
system of double hearings was adopted in California 4 where a statute
similar to G.S. § 14-17 had been in effect. Under the system adopted,
" See Burgunder v. State, 55 Ariz. 411, 103 P.2d 256 (1940) ; House v. State,
192 Ark. 476, 92 S.W.2d 868 (1936); People v. Goodwin, 9 Cal. 2d 711, 72 P.2d
551 (1937) ; Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S.E. 201 (1930) ; Howell v. State,
102 Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 706 (1912) ; Acros v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 315, 29
S.W.2d 395 (1930).
" In Powell v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S.W.2d 279 (1938), and
State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 20 S.E. 873 (1894), solicitors were allowed to argue
the possibility of parole as a reason for inflicting the death penalty. In State v.
Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1938), the argument that if defendant were
not put to death he might escape and "get even" with State's witnesses was allowed.
" In State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 228, 77 S.E.2d 664, 668 (1953), Denny, J.,
speaking for the court, said: "Except in death cases, however, a new trial will not
be granted because of improper argument of counsel, unless an exception thereto
has been timely entered and duly preserved."
"' CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1 provides that "Evidence may be presented at the
further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the
crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty. The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment
or death shall be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of fact on
the evidence presented, and the penalty fixed shall be expressly stated in the
decision or verdict."
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the second hearing was held after a verdict of guilty had been returned,
to hear evidence bearing on what punishment the defendant should
receive. Before this system was adopted, the California court had held
that mitigating evidence was inadmissible as not pertaining to the issue
of guilt ;35 however, the court, in other cases, 36 had approved instructions
that the jury must find some mitigating circumstance in order to
recommend that the sentence be only life imprisonment. Obviously the
double hearing system eliminated the injustice to capital defendants re-
sulting from the combined effect of these decisions.
Though North Carolina has not experienced the same problem that
California faced, the adoption of a similar statute would eliminate the
possibility of argument for the death penalty prejudicing the defendant
on the issue of guilt. Under such a system defendant would no longer
have to present the inconsistent arguments that he is not guilty, but that
if he is found guilty a life sentence should be recommended. Under
this system counsel for both sides should be held rigidly to evidence and
argument thereon pertaining to the issue of guilt in the first phase of
trial. If defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, then there should
be a second hearing before the same jury on the question of punishment.
Evidence and argument could then be presented as to the character and
previous record of defendant, and facts and circumstances in aggrava-
tion or mitigation of the crime could be shown.37 The double hearing
concept seems to assume that the jury should be charged to consider the
evidence and to exercise their discretion thereon in determining whether
to inflict the death penalty or recommend life imprisonment. Jury dis-
cretion would still be present, but hearing evidence solely in regard to
the penalty, coupled with a charge from the judge to consider the evi-
dence, would tend to give the jury something more than mere whim as a
criterion for exercise of that discretion.38
" People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915).
"E.g., People v. Kolez, 23 Cal. 2d 670, 145 P.2d 580 (1944).
"Although there is no jury in a court martial, military procedure provides
that "after the court has announced findings of guilty, the prosecution and defense
may present appropriate matter to aid the court in determining the kind and
amount of punishment to be imposed." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 119 (1951). Note that the military system of double hearings is not lim-
ited to capital cases.
18 Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1099 (1953).
Note that the California statute, discussed supra note 35, assumes that existing
law would allow defendant to waive a jury in a capital case. Clearly no such
waiver could be made under existing North Carolina law. The California statute
further assumes an existing murder statute which specifies that the trier of fact
may recommend the alternative penalties of death or life imprisonment. In North
Carolina the jury, by the terms of G.S. § 14-17, is only permitted to recommend
life imprisonment. The absence of a recommendation by the jury requires the
judge to enter a death sentence. The proviso in G.S. § 14-17 requires the recom-
mendation to be made at the same time the verdict of guilty is rendered.
A system of double hearings would seem to accomplish the purposes outlined
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Regardless of the suggested legislation, it is submitted that the three-
justice controlling opinion in the Manning case should not be accepted
as definitive of the law in regard to the solicitor's telling prospective
jurors that the State will seek the death penalty. The other three justices
said that as long as North Carolina law permits capital punishment the
State is entitled to seek the death penalty. The seventh member of the
court expressed a similar view in his dissent in State v. Pugh,3 9 where he
stated his opposition to a holding "that counsel must not contaminate
the jury with any argument as to the bearing the evidence should have
on the recommendation. '4° Thus it would appear that in a case squarely
presenting the question four members of the court would uphold the
right of the State to ask the jury not to recommend life imprisonment
and to argue on this point to some extent. Such a holding would be
more in keeping with the present law that a defendant found guilty of
a capital crime must die unless the jury recommends otherwise. On
the other hand, the fact that in Manning five justices held it error for
the solicitor to say that the only reason for having the trial was to
put defendant to death demonstrates that, regardless of their views as
to whether G.S. § 14-17 would permit the State to argue for death, a
majority of the court would reverse where such argument becomes
prejudicial per se.41
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Trial Practice-Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem
Argument to the Jury
In Ratner v. Arrington' a Florida Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge in a personal injury action had not abused his discretion in
allowing the use of the per diem argument as a measurement of pain and
suffering damages. The plaintiff's counsel had been permitted, over
objection, to use a placard in his closing argument on which were listed
various elements of plaintiff's damages, including an amount for pain
and suffering calculated at fifteen dollars per day for the length of his life
in the text whether defendant is allowed to waive the jury or not. However, since
G.S. § 14-17 seems to contemplate but one hearing, it would appear that the
adoption of the suggested system *ould require that G.S. § 14-17 be repealed and
that it be replaced with a statute allowing the jury to recommend alternative pun-
ishments. The new murder statute could provide for double hearings, or a
separate section could be enacted to accomplish the purpose.
311250 N.C. at 286, 108 S.E.2d at 655.40 250 N.C. at 289, 108 S.E.2d at 657.
"' "Prejudicial per se" is used in the text to distinguish between the types of
prejudice that the court has traditionally recognized as grounds for a new trial, and
the "possibility of prejudice" suggested by the writer as inherent in the present
single-hearing system of trial in capital cases.
111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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expectancy. In a similar action, Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v.
Harrington,2 the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held that counsel's use of a per diem or other mathematical formula to
measure pain and suffering was error, for it allowed him to invade the
province of the jury and get before it that which did not appear in the
evidence.
In the Virginia case the plaintiff's counsel had been allowed by the
lower court to place the per diem figures for pain and suffering on a black-
board. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that it was not improper
for counsel to use figures placed upon a blackboard, provided that the
figures were supported by the evidence. The great majority of juris-
dictions allow the use of the blackboard to some degree in a jury argu-
ment 3 The propriety of using this method to list damage elements
depends upon whether in a particular jurisdiction counsel would be
allowed to put such elements before the jury in oral argument. 4  Thus
where the court does not allow graphic illustrations of per diem figures,
its objection goes to the use of the mathematical formula applied to pain
and suffering, and not to the blackboard or other means of illustration
used.
The propriety of the per diem argument for pain and suffering dam-
ages was first litigated in 19505 and has been directly ruled upon in
nine states. Five states have sanctioned the use of the per diem argu-
ment,6 and four have condemned it.7  In W'uth v. United States,8 an
2 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
3 Apparently, in all jurisdictions the granting or denying of permission to use a
blackboard and the extent to which it may be used rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court. Haycock v. Christie, 249 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Upon timely
objection, however, the jury should be instructed that neither the blackboard nor
argument of counsel is evidence. Miller v. Loy, 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N.E.2d
38 (1959) ; see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 177 (1955).
'McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958). Counsel should not
allow the damage figures to remain before the jury at any time other than during
argument. Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130 N.E.2d 491 (1955). The
court in Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956), refused to make a
distinction between the use of a blackboard listing the damages prayed for and
the use of a prepared chart for the same purpose. The use of a prepared chart
would preclude the opposing counsel's erasing the figures and replacing them with
some of his own. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1955) (use of a chart
not in evidence relating to damages) ; 1 BELLI, MoDERN TRIALS §§ 130, 133(2),
135 (1954).
'J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
6 (1) Alabama: McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958). (2)
Florida: Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). (3) Minne-
sota: Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957) ;
Flarhrerty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958).
In two cases prior to the Boutang case, Alstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955), and Hallada v. Great No. Ry., 244
Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673 (1955), the court held that the per diem arguments
could not be allowed. In Boutang, however, the court discussing these two cases
said: "In neither case did we hold that the mathematical formula may not be
used for purely illustrative purposes. In Hallada we merely held that the
segmentation process of breaking the damage picture into fragments and then
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action under the Federal'Tort Claims Act, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia sitting without a jury refused to apply the
per diem method of evaluation to pain and suffering damages. In an
admiralty action9 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, expressly
endorsed the use of the per diem formula. 10 In view of the limited num-
ber of jurisdictions which have considered the issue there would seem
to be no discernible weight of authority at this time, and even the Florida
court in the Ratner decision which allowed per diem expressed a desire
not to foreclose the question.:"
The various reasons advanced in support of the per diem argument
are as follows: (1) The very absence of a fixed standard for the mon-
etary measurement of pain and suffering is reason for allowing wide
applying to each fragment a mathematical formula whereby damages are calculated
at a fixed rate per day for the entire period of the injured person's life expectancy,
though illuminating, may be misleading and therefore may not be used as a yard-
stick for determining the reasonableness of the award for damages. This rule
does not bar the use of the mathematical formula for purely illustrative purposes."
Quacre as to the distinction between illustrative and non-illustrative use of the
per diem argument. (4) Mississippi: 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954) ; Arnold v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d
744 (1957). (5) Texas: J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, szpra note 5 (no
objection had been made to argument at trial).
'Delaware: Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1959). (2) New
Jersey: Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). The court not only
held that a mathematical formula argument was improper but overruled prior de-
cisions in saying that any statements by counsel requesting a specific award or even
disclosing the total amount prayed for was improper. In Henne v. Balick, supra, the
court did not go this far and stated only that the per diem argument was im-
proper. (3) Pennsylvania: The court has steadfastly refused to allow counsel
to disclose the amount claimed or expected when damages are unliquidated. Thus
this state must be included with those prohibiting the per diem argument. See
Stassum v. Chapin, 234 Pa. 125, 188 Atl. 111 (1936) ; Bostwick v. Pittsburgh Rys.,
255 Pa. 387, 100 AtI. 123 (1917) ; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry., 177 Pa. 1, 35 AtI.
191 (1896). (4) Virginia: Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va.
109, 109 S.E.2d 126 (1959).
At the time of Botta v. Brunner, supra, in 1958, the weight of authority was
clearly in favor of allowing the per diem argument. Since that time two state
courts, in Henne v. Balick, supra, and Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harring-
ton, supra, and one federal court in Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Va. 1958), have adopted the Botta reasoning in refusing to sanction per diem. In
the two decisions allowing per diem arguments subsequent to the Botta decision,
McLaney v. Turner, supra note 6, and Ratner v. Arrington, supra, note 6, the
former was decided less than five months after Botta and did not mention that
case in following the then existing majority reasoning.8 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958).
o Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 941 (1956), affirming 141 F. Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
" Admiralty courts are not bound by all the rules of evidence required in com-
mon law actions and may receive evidence which might be inadmissible in other
courts. 3 BENEDIcr, ADuMnEALTY § 381 (6th ed. 1940). It is questionable, there-
fore, whether Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, supra note 9, would be authority for the
use of the per diem argument in common law actions.
11 "The ultimate course of judicial opinion on the point [per diem] is not yet
discernible. Recent holdings, for and against the allowance of such arguments,
are not grounded on reasons of sufficient force to compel the decision either way.
Therefore, in approving the practice now we do not purport to foreclose the
question." Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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latitude in arguing these damages,12 and counsel should be allowed to
draw all proper inferences from the evidence.'3 (2) The trier of facts
should be guided by some reasonable and practical considerations, as an
award for pain and suffering should not depend upon a mere guess.' 4
(3) The per diem arguments are not evidence, but are merely illustra-
tive,15 and the jury is free to weigh the argument and pass on its credi-
bility.1
Courts not allowing this argument generally have relied on the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) Pain and suffering have no known dimensions, and
the only standard is "reasonable compensation." Thus there is no direct
correlation between money and physical or mental suffering.'7 (2) Rea-
sonable compensation for pain and suffering cannot be determined by
multiplying the life expectancy by a fixed rate per day since the varieties
and degrees of pain are infinite and differ among individuals, and in the
same individual these will vary from day to day.'8 (3) The allowance
of the argument would permit counsel to introduce factors not admissible
in evidence, since no witness would be permitted to testify as to the
reasonable award for pain and suffering.19 (4) The argument is preju-
dicial to defendant's counsel because he must either risk its effect upon
the jury or argue a lesser per diem sum. By arguing a lesser sum he
fortifies his adversary's implication that the law recognizes pain and
suffering as capable of being measured by a mathematical yardstick.20
The particular effect which the per diem argument may have upon
the jury's award for pain and suffering is difficult to ascertain. Courts
have stated that it leads to monstrous verdicts2 ' and that it puts before
the jury figures out of proportion to those which they would otherwise
have in mind.22 One of the leading exponents of the argument explains:
- Ratner v. Arrington, supra note 11.
" McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So. 2d 315 (1958).
"Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
941 (1956).
'SBoutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957).1 8J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
1? Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
"Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1959).
"Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 109 S.E.2d 126
(1959).
20 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d (1958). For an interesting argument
that there is a yardstick to measure pain and suffering see Dollars-and-Sense
Appraisal in F.E.L.A. Cases, Panel Discussion at the Eighteenth Annual Law
Institute of the University of Tennessee College of Law and the Knoxville Bar
Ass'n, November 8, 1957 in 25 TENN. L. Rxv. 220, 227-30 (1958). The panelist
observes that the yardstick exists in practical experiences. When one pays fifty
dollars to an anesthetist to be free from pain for one hour during an operation, or
one similarly gives the dentist three dollars for fifteen minutes of relief, that
these are cases where a human being has to put pain in one side of the scale and
money in the other and weigh them.
" Alstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873
(1955).
" Henne v. Balick, - Del. -, 146 A.2d 394 (1958).
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When it [pain and suffering] is thus broken down into seconds
and minutes, then a jury begins to realize the real meaning of this
permanent pain and suffering of which the doctors have spoken,
and that $60,000 at $5 a day, is not an excessive award ...
Jurors must start thinking in days, minutes, and seconds and in
$5, $3, and $2, so that they can multiply to the absolute figure....
[H]e has started thinking, and when he follows this system of
multiplication he comes to a substantial figure ....
A Florida case24 illustrates the apparent effectiveness of per diem. A
nine year old child obtained a jury verdict of 248,439 dollars which
exactly coincided with counsel's demands as set out on a chart before the
jury. Of the total recovery, 102,200 dollars was awarded for future pain,
suffering, and inconveniences which had been calculated on the chart at
five dollars per day for the duration of plaintiff's life expectancy.25
The North Carolina court recognizes pain and suffering as an element
of damages for personal injuries, 26 but the propriety of the per diem
argument has never been ruled upon. This court has refrained from
laying down exacting rules as to the latitude counsel is allowed in his
argument, especially in the area of damages for personal injury.2 In
Jenkins v. North Carolina Ore Dressing Co.28 the court stated that the
propriety of counsel's argument must ordinarily be left up to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, and the court will not review his decretion
unless it is apparent that the impropriety was gross and well calculated to
prejudice the jury. The court has stated that counsel may not travel out-"
side the record and inject facts not included in the evidence. 2  Counsel
is, however, allowed to argue every phase of the law supported by the
evidence and to deduce from the evidence all reasonable inferences.80
.- 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 133, at 871-72 (1954).
' Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
"An effective per diem argument is illustrated as follows: The attorney after
telling the jury that they must determine what his client's pain and suffering are
worth in dollars and cents says, "Let's take Pat, my client, down to the waterfront.
He sees Mike, an old friend .... and says, 'Mike, I've got a job for you....
You're not going to have to work any more for the rest of your life, and the best
part of this job is... you'll never lose it.... You don't have to do any work ....
All you have to do is trade me your good back for my bad one, and I'll give you
five dollars a day for the rest of your life. Do you know what five dollars a day
for the rest of your life is? Why that's $60,000!. Of course, I realize that you are
not going to be able to do any walking, or any swimming, or driving an automobile,
or be able to sit in a moving picture show; you're going to have excruciating pain-
and suffering with this job, thirty-one million seconds a year, and once you take
it on, you'll never be able to relieve yourself of this, but you get $60,000 1'" Ad-
dress by Melvin M. Belli, Mississippi State Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, June 2,
1951, in 22 Miss. L.J. 284, 319 (1951).
Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
27 See generally 2 McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1492(2d ed. 1956).2865 N.C. 563 (1871).
"Ilrvin v. Southern Ry., 164 N.C. 6, 37 S.E. 955 (1913).
"OLamborn v. Hollingsworth, 195 N.C. 350, 142 S.E. 19 (1928).
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There is no North Carolina case concerning the methods by which
the jury may assess pain and suffering damages. The jury must be
charged that the measure of recovery shall be a reasonable satisfaction
for the actual suffering of both body and mind which is the immediate
and necessary consequence of the injury.31
There are several factors which would seem to point toward an
approval of the per diem argument by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, when and if the issue is presented before it. First, it is required
in North Carolina that all prospective damages be reduced to their
present value,3 2 and to do this accurately the jury must ascertain the
present worth of a number of future installments.33  Thus under the
present value rule it would appear that the jury must in some manner
allot a definite sum of money for specific periods of the plaintiff's life.
Second, the North Carolina practice of reading the pleadings to the
jury informs them, through the ad damnum clause, of the amount de-
manded by the plaintiff as damages. Apparently, although there is no
case on this point, counsel in their final argument may relate to the
jury their estimate of the total worth of plaintiff's damages for pain and
suffering. The per diem argument would relate counsel's inference from
the evidence as to a portion of the total worth-the per diem worth.
Third, when the propriety of a trial practice is questioned on appeal,
the reviewing court may take judicial notice of the customary usage
of this practice in the lower courts.34 In Ratner v. Arrington5 the court
took judicial notice of the customary use in Florida trial courts of
3 Mintz v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 233 N.C. 607, 65 S.E.2d 120 (1951).
"Taylor v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 193 N.C. 775, 138 S.E. 129 (1927). In
applying this rule with respect to pain and suffering North Carolina is against the
weight of authority. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347, 1352 (1958); Annot., 154
A.L.R. 796, 801 (1945) ; 23 N.C.L. Rav. 46, 48 (1944).
A reason frequently quoted for refusing to permit a reduction of an award for
pain and suffering to its present value appears in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Candler,
238 Fed. 880, 885 (8th Cir. 1922), where the court said: "At best the allowance
[for pain and suffering] is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and
conscience of the jury, and we are convinced that a jury would be much more
likely to return a just verdict, considering the estimated life as one single period,
than if it should attempt to reach a verdict by dividing the life into yearly periods,
setting down yearly estimates, and then reducing the estimates to their present
value." This same reasoning is advanced by some courts in refusing to allow the
per diem argument.
.'McCoamcIC, DAMAGES § 86 (1935). The author notes two methods of
determining present value: (1) by the use of annuity tables and (2) by adding
to the sum to be paid in the future interest on the same sum during the interval,
dividing the result into the original sum, the quotient being the present value.
The incapacity of a jury to determine present value without the use of annuity
tables is apparent, unless an accountant be in their midst.
North Carolina refuses to allow the use of the annuity tables in determining
present value. Poe v. Railroad, 141 N.C. 525, 54 S.E. 406 (1906). Thus it is
doubtful that the jury gives any effect to the judge's present value charge.
", See Hanson v. Yandle, 235 N.C. 532, 70 S.E.2d 565 (1952); 31 C.J.S. Evi-
dence § 49 (1942).
' 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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damage charts and per diem arguments for pain and suffering dam-
ages. 6 Counsel in several North Carolina trial courts today are using
the per diem argument in their summation,37 and the Supreme Court
could properly take judicial notice of this practice.
It is submitted that the better rule would be to allow counsel to
argue that pain and suffering damages should be calculated on a per
diem basis. Forbidding the argument places a severe restriction on
the right and duty of an attorney to argue every phase of his case.
It denies the plaintiff the right of advocacy where the techniques of
persuasion are of crucial importance to him. Should abuse of the
privilege occur, either in application or in presentation, the appellate
judiciary has adequate processes to prevent injustice to either party.
WILLIAm H. McNAIR
"Accord, 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144
(1954); cf. Haley v. Hockey, 103 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
" Personal observation of trials by the writer and inquiries to practicing
attorneys concerning personal injury actions in North Carolina indicate that
damage charts and the per diem argument are often utilized without objection from
the defendant's counsel or the court.
